
Book V- ^^> 






U 



STRICTURES 



ON 



NULLIFICATION 



"S 



STRICTURE S 



ON 



NULiLilFICATION. 



FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. 



BOSTON: 

STIMPSON AND CLAPP, 72 WASHINGTON STREET. 
J. E. Hinckley & Co., Printers, 14 Water Street. 

1832. 



STRICTURES 



ON NULLIFICATION 



The discontents on the subject of the Tariff, which have so 
long existed in several of the Southern States, and particularly in 
South Carolina, have at length reached a crisis. As soon as it 
was ascertained that the party in favor of Nullification had 
prevailed in that St"-te at the late elections, the Governor imme- 
diately summoned an extraordinary session of the Legislature, 
which was held accordingly at Columbia, on the 22d of Oc- 
tober. In calling together the new Legislature before the 
end of the current political year, as generally understood, 
the Governor exercised an authority, which may perhaps be 
fairly considered as doubtful, although it appears to have been 
sanctioned by the highest judicial authority of the State. This, 
however, is a secondary question, upon which we shall not 
enlarge. In the message which he transmitted to the Legis- 
lature at the opening of the extraordinary session, the Gov- 
ernor recommended to them to pass an act authorizing the 
meeting of a Convention, to deliberate upon the measures to 
be taken by the State for the purpose of obtaining relief from 
the operation of the Tariff. The act was accordingly passed 
bylarge majorities, — two thirds being required by the Constitu- 
tion ; — and the Convention, which w^as chosen in pursuance 
of it, opened its session at Columbia on the 19th of Novem- 
ber. 



This body proceeded at once and without much discussion 
to adopt what they call an ' Ordinance to nullify ' the Revenue 
laws of the country, which we propose to copy in the course 
of our remarks. Having published this act, with an accom- 
panying exposition of their motives in passing it;, and addresses 
to the people of the United States and of South Carolina, the 
Convention adjourned without day, leaving it in charge to a 
committee appointed for that purpose to summon another 
meeting, if it should appear expedient. The composition of 
the Ordinance is attributed to Chancellor Harper ; that of the 
exposition accompanying it to Mr. McDuffie ; and that of the 
addresses to the people of the United States and of South 
Carolina respectively to General Hayne and Mr. Turnbull. 
The Legislature of the State have since assembled, and, agree- 
ably to the tenor of the Ordinance, will doubtless pass such 
laws as may be thought necessary for carrying the measure 
into full effect. 

These proceedings constitute a very serious crisis, — the most 
serious that has occurred in the history of our country since the 
establishment of the Government, with the exception of that 
which attended the close of the last war with Great Britain, 
and from which, by the fortunate intervention of the Peace, 
we escaped without injury. In the present instance, there 
seems to be no prospect of evading the difficulty in any 
such w^ay. We must meet it in front, and either overcome 
it, or submit to all its consequences. 

The general principles by which the statesmen of South 
Carolina undertake to support their views, have been al- 
ready very fully discussed in various quarters. But, con- 
sidering the great importance and urgent interest of the 
subject, it may not be wholly superfluous to take, once 
more, a calm, and as far as may be, impartial survey of the 
ground in dispute. In doing this, we shall of course leave 
out of view the topics of the constitutionality and expediency 
of the measures of the General Government, which are the 
motive or pretext for the present proceedings in Carolina. 
Believing, as we do, that the Protecting Policy is founded in 
a correct understanding of the principles of the Constitution, 
and of the true interest of the country, we still very cheerfully 
recognise in our fellow-citizens of all the States, the right to 
entertain a different opinion, and to act upon it in a legal 



and constitutional way. The precise question now before us 
is, whether the present proceedings in South Carolina are 
legal and constitutional. The most authentic and elaborate 
exposition of the arguments that are urged in defence of them, 
is to be found in the letter of the Vice-President of the Uni- 
ted States to Governor Hamilton, of August 28, 1832, to 
which we shall accordingly refer as the leading authority in 
their favor. 

In the course of our remarks, we shall generally employ the 
term annul, in preference to the new-fashioned word nullify. 
The meaning of the two, as given in the dictionaries, is ex- 
actly the same, but the former is in better use, and presents 
to most minds a more distinct idea than the latter. It is well 
known that one of tlie most frequent sources of obscurity and 
confusion in reasoning, is the use of terms which, from what- 
ever cause, are in any degree vague ; and we have very little 
doubt that in the present controversy, the error of the Caro- 
lina statesmen may be attributed in part to the unfortunate 
substitution of the new-fangled terms nullify and nullification, 
for the corresponding good old English words annul and an- 
nulling. Many a professed nullifier would, we suspect, shrink 
from the assertion that a State has a right to annul an act of 
the General Government. Mr. Calhoun seldom employs 
the latter term, and states expressly, that he does 'not 
claim for a State the right to abrogate ' an act of the General 
Government. Now, according to Johnson, the meaning of 
abrogate is to talic aivay from a laiv its force, to repeal, to 
annul. To annul, according to the same authority, is to inake 
void, to nullify, to reduce to notliiiig : and finally, to nullify 
is to annul, to make void. The meaning of the three words, 
in correct usage, is exactly the same ; and Mr. Calhoun, in dis- 
claiming the right of a State to abrogate an act of the General 
Government, really disclaims the right to annul or nullify such 
an act, in any proper sense of those terms, and abandons in a 
single sentence the doctrine which he is at so much pains to 
establish in the rest of his exposition. In disclaiming the use 
of the word abrogate, abstaining generally from that of annul, 
and taking refuge in what Governor Lumpkin very properly 
calls the mystical terms nullify and nullification, the Vice 
President has, we think, betrayed a secret consciousness of 
the weak point in his cause. 



6 

The controversy is, however, not about words, but things. 
The right which the Vice-President disclaims under the name 
of abrogating, but claims for a State under that of nuUifi/ing 
an act of the General Government, is thus stated by himself in 
the letter alluded to above. 

l._ 'A State has a right, in her sovereign capacity in Con- 
vention, to declare an unconstitutional act of Congress to be 
null and void ; and such declaration is obligatory on her citi- 
zens, and conclusive against the General Government ; which 
would have no right to enforce its construction of its powers 
against that of the State.' 

2. Upon the exercise of this right by a State, ' it would be 
the duty of the General Government to abandon the power, 
at least as far as the nullifying State is concerned, and to apply 
to the States themselves, according to the form prescribed by 
the Constitution, to obtain it by a grant.' 

3. If the power thus applied for be ' granted, acquiescence 
then would be a duty on the part of the State ; and in that 
event, the contest would terminate in converting a doubtful 
constructive power into one positively granted : but should it 
not be granted^ no alternative would remain for the General 
Government lut its permanent abandonment.' 

Such are tho three leading points in the doctrine of nul- 
lijicatioh, as laid down by its principal champion. It will 
be perceived that they contemplate not a single act, but a 
long and complex course of proceedings, involving the agency 
not only of ti..^ nullifying State, but of the General Government 
and of all tl.e otr^r States. The discontented State nullifies 
an obnc::ious act : it then becomes the duty of the General 
Governnj >L to cease to execute the act within that State, and 
to apply tc the States for the power in dispute : if the power 
be obtained, it is the duty of the nullifying State to acquiesce : 
if not, the ac is definitively annulled. 

Now, if al' fhis be legal and constitutional, why do we find 
no mention or hint of any part of it in the Constitution or the 
laws ? As res;-3cts the first and third steps in the proceedings, 
it may be urg^. i, v.ith some plausibility, that the Constitution is 
silent, because it does not undertake to regulate in any way 
the action of tl,3 States, as bodies politic, or'of their Govern- 
ments. But \ hat account can be given of the silence of the 
Constitution U|:on the second step in the proceedings? When 



a State has exercised the power of annulling an act of Con- 
gress, it then becomes ' the duty of the General Government 
to abandon the power, (by which Mr. Calhoun doubtless 
means to discontinue executing the act) at least within the 
limits of the nullifying State, and to apply to the States them- 
selves in the form prescribed by the Constitution, to obtain it 
by a grant.' Here is a two-fold duty of great delicacy and 
importance, which, according to the Vice-President, devolves, 
in a certain contingency, upon the General Government. The 
General Government is bound to discontinue the execution of 
one of its laws within a particular State, and the General Gov- 
ernment is bound to apply to the States, in the form prescribed 
in the Constitution, for a grant of the power to pass such a lav.\ Of 
all this the Constitution says not one word. If the passage which 
we have quoted from the exposition stood alone, we should, in 
fact, be entirely at a loss to know what the Vice-President 
means in this place by the form prescribed in the Constitution, 
as that in which the General Government is to apply to 
the States for a grant of new powers : but fi-om other parts of 
the document, we gather that he alludes to the clause which 
prescribes a form for amending that instrument. Now it is 
undoubtedly true that the General Government might, if they 
should by constitutional majorities deem it expedient, recom- 
mend to the States an amendment, which, if carried, w^ould 
have the effect of augmenting their powers ; but it is equally 
certain that the clause, which provides a form for amending 
the Constitution, does not make it the duty of fi3 General 
Government to recommend an amendment of this description 
in the case supposed by the Vice-President, or in any other. 
In this as in all its other parts, the Constitution is entirely silent 
upon the important duties which are supposed by the Vice- 
President to devolve upon the General Government, in conse- 
quence of the exercise by a State of its supposed right to annul 
an act of that Government. Are these duties to be imposed, and 
the rights and powers necessary to their execution conferred 
upon the General Government, by mere construction ? Is it not 
a little singular, that the advocates of this very liberal construc- 
tion are precisely the persons who are most decidedly op- 
posed to all constructive powers, and whose principal object 
Ml all their present proceedings is to reduce, if necessary by 



8 

main force, the constructive powers of the General Govern- 
ment to the narrowest possible compass? 

The Constitution, we repeat, is totally silent in regard to the 
powers attributed by the theory of nullification to the States 
and to the General Government. This fact might, perhaps, 
fairly be considered as of itself a sufficient and decisive objec- 
tion to the whole system. Let us next inquire, how far these 
powers are in themselves susceptible of being exercised. If 
it shall appear that the duties which, according to this system, 
devolve respectively upon the States and the General Govern- 
ment are not only not prescribed in the Constitution, but are 
also physically and morally impracticable, there will arise a 
pretty strong presumption that it could not have been the in- 
tention of the framers of the Constitution that any such acts 
should be performed. 

The first step in the process is, as we have said, the 
annulling by the discontented State of the obnoxious act of 
the General Government. The State declares the act to be 
null and void, and takes measures to prevent the execution of 
it within its limits. How far this will be found a practicable 
operation we shall be better able to judge when we are informed 
of the proceedings of the Carolina Legislature. For the present, 
it may be sufficient to say that the various projects which have 
been successively recommended in the newspapers have been 
so obviously chimerical and visionary, as to render it altogether 
probable that no satisfactory scheme had suggested itself to 
the leaders, and very doubtful whether it would be possible to 
hit upon one. Without, however, anticipating what the wis- 
dom of the Legislature may bring forth, let us proceed at once 
to the second step in the process ; viz. the duties which de- 
volve upon the General Government. This part of the theory, 
we may observe, though it has been less adverted to, is, in the 
opinion of the Vice-President, not less important and valuable 
than the other, and equally essential to the completeness of the 
system. If it be found impracticable, the whole theory must 
be given up. 

A State having nullified an act of the General Government, 
it then becomes the duty of the General Government to aban- 
don the power (of passing such an act), and to apply to the 
States, in the form of proposing an amendment of the Consti- 
tution, for the grant of such a power. Let us see how far 
these duties are practicable. 



The General Government consists of three branches, the 
Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary, to each of which 
its peculiar and appropriate functions are assigned by the Con- 
stitution and the laws. What then is meant, when it is said 
that it becomes the duty of the General Government to aban- 
don the power to pass a certain act, at least within the limits 
of a particular State? Is it meant that the Legislative 
department of the General Government is bound to repeal 
the obnoxious law, as respects that State or the Union at large ? 
This is obviously impossible, because by the supposition the 
majority of the Legislature believe the act to be constitutional 
and expedient, — and therefore cannot conscientiously, in the 
ordinary exercise of the Legislative power, repeal it. 

Is it meant, that the Executive and Judiciary departments of 
the General Government shall suspend the execution of the 
law within the limits of the State in question ? This again, 
is equally impossible. The functions of the Executive and 
Judiciary departments are entirely administrative. The 
persons entrusted with them have no discretionary power. 
They are bound by their oaths of office to execute the laws 
that are given to them by the Legislature, and have no more 
right to augment or diminish them by one jot or tittle, than 
they have to declare themselves dictators of the country. 
The abandonment by the General Government of the power 
to pass the act complained of by the nullifying State is there- 
fore a thing in itself entirely impracticable. Even the omnip- 
otent Parliament of England, which, according to Lord Coke, 
can do any thing but convert a man into a woman, could not 
repeal a law which was sustained by a majority of its members ; 
nor could even the hereditary executive power of England or 
any other constitutional monarchy suspend for a moment the 
execution of a law, which is still in force. The thing is in its 
nature a moral impossibility. 

So much for the first part of the two-fold duty, which, ac- 
cording to the Vice-President, devolves upon the General 
Government, in the event of the nullification by a State of a 
law of the L^nited States. But the General Government is 
not only bound to abandon the disputed power, but also to 
apply to the States, in the form provided for amending the 
Constitution, for a grant of that power. We have seen that 
the first of these supposed duties is in its nature impracticable. 
Itisobvioustothe slightest reflection, that the other is not less so. 
2 



10 

By the General Government the Vice-President must of course 
intend, in this connexion, the Legislative department of the 
Government, the Executive, as such, having nothing to do with 
the process of amendment. Now, independently of the objection 
to which we have already adverted, viz. that the Constitution im- 
poses no such duty on the Legislature, it is plain that the opera- 
tion is in itself impracticable, for the same reason which would 
prevent the repeal of the obnoxious act. The Legislature cannot 
recommend an amendment of the Constitution, giving to itself 
the power to pass such an act, for the plain reason, that by the 
supposition a majorit}- of the members believe that the Legis- 
lature already possess the power, and that it is consequently 
impracticable for them to adopt, on their official responsibility, 
a measure which implies that they believe the contrary. 

It is only necessary to consider for a moment how the plan 
would work in detail, in order to be convinced that it is utter- 
ly impracticable. It becomes the duty of the General Gov- 
ernment, by which we will suppose the Vice-President to 
mean the Legislature, to apply to the States for a grant of the 
disputed power. But what is the Legislature ? The Legislature 
is a complex being, composed of the President and two elec- 
tive assemblies, comprehending two hundred and eighty-five 
persons. It is the duty, it seems, of these two hundred and 
eighty-five persons, in their political capacity, to apply to the 
States for a grant of new powers. But who is to move? 
What is the business of every body is the business of nobody. 
Shall it be the President ? The Constitution makes it the 
duty of the President to recommend from time to time to the 
consideration of Congress such measures, as he shall judge 
necessary and expedient. But the President, by the sup- 
position, believes that the General Government already possess 
the power in question. It is impossible, therefore, that he 
should recommend to Congress to propose an amendment 
conferring this power. For the same reason, the proposition 
cannot be made in Congress by a member of the majority of 
either House. The duty, such as it is, of making the propo- 
sition, might no doubt be performed by some member of the 
minority of one of the two branches. But how are the ma- 
'ority to vote for a proposition which they do not approve ? 
How is the President to approve a law which he does not ap- 
prove ? Individuals occasionally support or oppose measures 
for particular reasons, which have no reference to their own 



11 

opinion upon their merits ; but in arguing on general principles, 
it must of course be assumed that the members of the Gov- 
ernment can only act on principle. The operation supposed 
is therefore in its nature essentially impracticable. 

Indeed the supposition that it can in any case be the duty 
of one or more individuals to do an act which, if done by them 
at all, must be done in pursuance of their own free and unbias- 
ed belief in its expediency, is so obviously incongruous, that 
we really wonder how an acute logician, as the Vice-President 
unquestionably is, could have been led by any prepossession or 
political hallucination to admit it for a moment. If it be really 
the duty, under the Constitution, of the Legislature or of any 
branch or member of it to perform a particular act, there is no 
room for the exercise of discretion. The thing must be done. 
Thus it is the duty of the House to choose their speaker 
and other officers. This is accordingly done at the open- 
ing of every new Congress, as a matter of course, and it would 
be unconstitutional even to debate upon the propriety of so 
doing. But a proposition to amend the Constitution or any 
act performed in the ordinary exercise of the Legislative pow- 
er, must be, from its nature, the result of the free and conscien- 
tious judgment of the President and a majority of the two 
Houses of Congress upon its merits ; and it is impossible that it 
can be their duty, in any case, to decide in favor of a particular 
measure without reference to its merits, when their own free 
and conscientious judgment upon its merits is the precise and 
only rule which they are bound to follow, in the decision of 
every question that is brought before them. 

The process of nullification is therefore, in its most important 
points, absolutely impracticable. This being the case, any con- 
sideration of its constitutionality or expediency is superfluous. 
It is unnecessary to inquire whether a plan, which cannot in 
the nature of things be carried into execution, would or would 
not be constitutional or expedient if it could. But the respect 
which we sincerely entertain for the talents and character of 
many of the citizens who are engaged in this project, seems to 
render it proper that it should be viewed under all its different 
aspects. Let us therefore suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that the project is practicable, and look at it in reference to 
its expediency. Passing over as before the first step in the 
process, the effect of which is less certain because the precise 
form in which it will be taken is not yet known, let us as be- 



12 

fore proceed at once to the second, and inquire how it will 
operate in the case immediately in question. 

Let us suppose, then, that the State of South Carolina annuls 
the Tariff. On the theory of the Vice-President, it will then 
become the duty of the General Government to refrain from en- 
forcing the Tariffwithin the limits of South Carolina, and to apply 
to the States for a grant of power to pass laws for the protection 
of domestic industry. We have shown that both parts of this 
duty are wholly impracticable ; but let us imagine that they 
could be performed, and see what would be the result. Let 
us suppose that the General Government, at the present session 
of Congress, in defiance of their own opinion of the constitu- 
tionality and expediency of the Protecting Policy and of the 
express provision of the Constitution that all duties, imposts 
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, sus- 
pend the execution of the Tariff law within the limits of South 
Carolina. — Let us also suppose that the General Government, 
conscientiously believing, as they do, that they possess the 
power to pass laws for the protection of domestic industry, shall 
yet assure the people that they believe they do not possess it, 
and recommend an amendment of the Constitution which shall 
give it to them. What will be the result? 

The suspension of the Tariff law, within the limits of South 
Carohna, would of course render the ports of that State entirely 
free. As soon as this fact became generally known at home 
and abroad, the whole foreign commerce of the country would 
centre in these ports, and the receipts of the custom-houses, 
which constitute nearly the whole revenue of the country, 
would be reduced at once to nothing. In the mean time, the 
process of amending the Constitution is notoriously a very slow 
one. We have supposed that the General Government, at 
the same session of Congress, at which they suspend the exe- 
cution of the Tariff law in Carolina, propose to the States to 
adopt the amendment in question. The recommendation goes 
out to the Governors of the States, and is laid by them before 
their several Legislatures, as they come into session at various 
times in the course of the following year. Some of these 
Legislatures act upon it at once ; some lay it on their tables 
never to take it up again ; others refer it, as they habitually 
do all questions of an embarrassing description, to their next 
following session. In this way the affair drags along for a 
number of years, and it is "even very doubtful whether any 



13 

returns at all would ever be received from half the States. 
Let us suppose, however, that in process of time, say in five 
years from the date of the proposal by the General Gov- 
ernment, returns are received from all the States, and let it be 
granted for argument's sake, that the proposed amendment 
is not sanctioned by the number of States necessary under 
the Constitution to give it effect, which is three-fourths of the 
whole: — this is the supposition most favorable to the views 
of the Vice-President. What follows ? Is the great object 
of settling the construction of the Constitution attained ? Quite 
the contrary. Not a single step has been yet taken towards 
the attainment of it. The refusal of the States to sanction the 
proposed amendment, far from proving that the General Gov- 
ernment does not, according to their construction of the Consti- 
tution, possess the disputed power, might be, and in many cases 
undoubtedly would be, the result of their belief that the Gen- 
eral Government already possesses it. How, for example, could 
Pennsylvania, where the Legislature unanimously believe that 
the General Government possesses the power to protect do- 
mestic industry, sanction the proposal of an amendment in- 
tended to confer that power? The refusal of the States to 
sanction the amendment would therefore prove nothing at all as 
to their opinion upon the meaning of the Constitution, and would 
leave the whole subject exactly as it stood before. The Vice- 
President tells us, it is true, that if the proposed amendment 
were not sanctioned by the requisite number of States, 
no alternative would remain for the General Government, 
but the permanent abandonment of the disputed power. But, 
with all due deference to the judgment of Mr. Calhoun, we 
must be permitted to say that this is a conclusioii entirely with- 
out premises, or, in less technical language, a naked assertion 
without proof, and we may add without even the appearance 
of plausibility. If the States refuse to amend the Constitution, 
it remains of course as it was before ; and it is the duty of the 
General Government, as it was before, to act upon their own 
construction of its meaning, which is, by the supposition, in 
favor of the reality of the contested power. As honest men, act- 
ing on their official responsibility, they cannot possibly do 
otherwise ; they would be obliged to re-enact the law which, 
by the supposition, had been repealed in reference to the nul- 
lifying State, and things would proceed exactly as they did be- 
fore. At the end of the process, therefore, — supposing it even 



14 

to result in the manner most favorable to the Vice-President's 
view, — the whole subject would remain precisely as it stood at 
the beginning. The affair would afford a new example of 
what a foreign writer has called the system of All Action and 
No Go. 

In the mean time, what would have been the state of the 
country during the five years which have been devoted to this 
tedious, complicated and ineffectual attempt to settle the con- 
struction of the Constitution ? The revenue would have de- 
clined almost to nothing, and there would have been of course 
an annual deficit of nearly the whole amount necessary to de- 
fray the expenses of the Government, and pay the interest and 
principal of the debt. How would this have been covered? 
The ordinary resource in cases of deficit is a loan, but it may 
well be doubted whether, under the circumstances supposed, 
the credit of the Government would be particularly good. 
If loans could be obtained, which ia the most favorable suppo- 
sition, we should be saddled with a debt of about a hundred 
millions, probably at exorbitant interest, as the cost of this po- 
litical experiment. Were this the only inconvenience, most 
judicious citizens would be disposed to say, with the Gre- 
cian philosopher who was offered, at a pretty high price, 
the favors of a frail beauty of some celebrity, — that they did 
not choose to buy repentance so dear. But this debt of a 
hundred millions would be the least part of the mischief The 
importation of foreign goods free of duty for five years would 
of course destroy all our domestic manufactures, and ruin that 
part of our population which, is employed in them. The value 
of the manufactures annually produced in this country is es- 
timated by Mr. Gallatin at about §150,000,000, — probably a 
very low computation. Supposing the ordinary rate of profit 
in this branch of industry to be at from six to seven per cent., 
this amount of annual products represents a capital of a thou- 
sand million dollars, which would be swept at once into nothing. 
This is another trifling item to be added to the cost and charges 
of nullification. Omitting all consideration of the effect upon 
the happiness of the six or seven hundred thousand persons who 
depend for subsistence upon these manufactures, and looking 
merely at the financial results, we must needs say that this 
is a most expensive, as well as in our opinion unsatisfactory, 
mode of expounding the Constitution. And these, as we have 
said, are the results of the process on the most favorable sup- 



15 

position ; for if loans could not be obtained, which is a more 
probable one, the immediate consequence would be a national 
bankruptcy, which would of course be followed instantaneously 
by domestic convulsions, a complete breaking up of the Gov- 
ernment, and a dissolution of the Union. 

Such, if the process of nullification, which, as we have seen, 
would be found utterly impracticable at every step, could be 
carried into effect, would be its practical results. Such would be 
its results, supposing it to proceed without opposition from any 
quarter, and to operate throughout in the manner most agree- 
able to the views set forth in Mr. Calhoun's exposition. Is 
it possible that a statesman of distinguished talents and patriotic 
feelings, — that a large majority of the citizens of a high-minded, 
generous and intelligent State,. can look forward to such results 
with satisfaction? — that they can consider a course of measures 
which, waving any question of its constitutionality or practica- 
bility, and supposing it to go into quiet operation without op- 
position in any quarter, and to work to their heart's content in 
every particular, could still produce nothing better than the 
results which we have described, — as expedient! — Is it not 
more probable that the Vice-President and his political friends, 
by confining their attention exclusively to one partial view of the 
subject, and employing with fanatical earnestness all their ener- 
gies in recommending this one view to the public favor, have 
entirely lost sight of all others, and are rushing forward, without 
even realizing its existence, to a precipice which is accurately and 
distinctly laid down by themselves in their own political charts? 

However this may be, it is plain from the most cursory survey 
of the doctrine of nullification, that it is wholly unsanctioned 
by the Constitution, although it contemplates important pro- 
ceedings, not only by the States but by the General Government, 
which of course can only act under constitutional authority : 
that it is in all its important points utterly impracticable, and 
that could it even be carried into effect, and that in the man- 
ner most agreeable to the views of its partisans, it would at 
once break up the Government, and spread desolation and ruin 
through the country. We now proceed to examine some of 
the arguments, by which this enormous political heresy is sup- 
ported in the document before us. We have already quoted 
the passages containing the statement of the doctrine in Mr. 
Calhoun's own language. The leading argument by which he 
sustains it is as follows. 

I. The General Government is an agent with limited powers, 



16 

constituted by the States as principals to execute their joint will, 
expressed in the Constitution. 

2. But in private affairs, a principal has a right to revoke or 
modify the powers of his agent at discretion, to put his own 
construction upon them, and to disavow and annul any acts 
done by the agent upon a mistaken construction of his powers; 
while the agent, on his part, has no right to enforce his con- 
struction against that of his principal. 

3. In the same way, any one State has a right to put its own 
construction upon the Constitution, by which the States create the 
General Government their common agent, and to disavow and 
annul any acts done by the General Government upon a mistaken 
construction of these powers, while the General Government, 
on its part, has no right to enforce its own construction of the 
Constitution against that of its principal. 

The correctness of this reasoning, says the Vice-President, 
in its application ' to the ordinaiy transactions of life, no one 
will doubt, nor can it he possible io assign a reason, why it is 
not as applicable to the case of a Government as to that of indi- 
viduals.' Not anticipating the nature of the objections that 
may be made to his reasoning, the Vice-President of course 
does not attempt to refute them, lor does he think it necessary 
to illustrate, explain or enforce his own theory, but, under the 
comfortable assurance that in its application to the ordinary 
transactions of life no one will doubt it, and that it cannot be pos- 
sible to assign a reason why it should not be applied in the case 
of Governments, he jumps at once to his conclusion, that it is 
and ought to be applicable to that of the United States. Now 
it is obvious to us, that this reasoning, far from commanding 
the universal assent which the Vice-President seems to expect 
for it, will be considered by most intelligent and unprejudiced 
readers as open to various weighty and decisive objections. 
Admitting that the General Government may, in a certain 
sense of the term, be properly described as the agent of the 
States, the other proposition, that a principal has an unlimited 
right to construe the powers and disavow the acts of his agent 
is, even in private affairs, far from being equally clear ; and 
were this even true in private affairs, it would by no means follow 
that any one State has an equally good right to annul at dis- 
cretion the acts of the General Government. We shall enlarge 
a little upon each of these points. 

I. It is not true that a principal has, in the ordi- 
nary transactions of life, an unlimited right to construe 



17 

the powers and disavow the acts of his agent. Ahhough 
an agent may have construed his po\^ers in a different man- 
ner from that in which his principal intended that they should 
be understood, yet if he can make it appear that he has exercised 
ordinary diligence and acted with good faith, he has a right to 
enforce his construction against that of his principal, and the law 
will sustain him in it. A merchant, for example, addresses a 
letter of instructions to a shipmaster or supercargo, and the latter 
in consequence makes contracts which the principal did not 
intend that he should make; the principal will nevertheless be 
bound by them, unless he can show that the agent has been 
guilty of neglect or fraud ; for it is his own fault if he has not 
made his instructions intelligible, or has chosen his agent so 
badly that he cannot understand plain language. 

The argument from analogy, and it is the only one by which 
the Vice-President undertakes to support his main position, 
therefore fails entirely. If the attitude of the General Govern- 
ment toward the States be the same as that of an agent in re- 
lation to his principal, it then follows that the General Govern- 
ment has a right to enforce its construction of the Constitution 
against that of the States, provided always that it act with good 
faith, and in the exercise of all the diligence and attention 
which the case requires. 

2. But admitting even that, in private affairs, a principal has 
an unlimited right to construe the powers and disavow the acts 
of his agent, we cannot agree with the Vice-President, that it 
is impossible to assign a reason why any single State has not 
an equally good right to annul at discretion the acts of the 
General Government. We think that at least two very suffi- 
cient reasons may be given, why this conclusion would not follow. 

The first reason is that the General Government, if it be 
regarded as an agency, is an agency for a joint concern, compre- 
prehending four and twenty principals. Now if we admit that 
principals have an unlimited right to construe the powers and 
disavow the acts of their agents, it is quite obvious that, in the 
case of a joint concern, this right cannot belong to any one of 
the partners acting separately from the others, but must be- 
long to the whole firm, expressing their intentions for this 
purpose through the organs and in the form which they habit- 
ually employ for all other purposes. But the proposition of 
the Vice-President is, that any one State has a right, without con- 
sulting the other States, to nullify at discretion any act of the 
3 



IS 

General Government. That is, that any one partner in the 
joint concern has aright, without even consultinghis co-partners, 
to construe the powers of the common agent in his own way, and 
to assume or avoid, at discretion, his share of responsibility for the 
acts which an agent may have performed in the name of the firm. 

It is almost needless to say that this is not the principle on 
which partnership concerns are generally managed, and that a 
partnership concern, which should be managed on this princi- 
ple, would not be likely to possess unhmited credit or to carry 
on for any length of time a very lucrative business. 

The Vice-President anticipates this objection, and for the 
purpose of meeting it has introduced the second and third 
points in his theory, as stated at the commencement of this 
article. As the manner in which he treats this part of the sub- 
ject is quite curious, we shall quote his own words. 

' It may, however, be proper to notice a distinction between the 
case of a single principal and his agent, and that of several prin- 
cipals and their joint agent, which might otherwise cause some 
confusion. In both cases, as between the agent and a principal, 
the construction of the principal, whether he be a single princi- 
pal, or one of several, is equally conclusive ; but, in the latter 
case, both the principal and the agent bear a relation to the other 
principals, which mast be taken into the estimate, in order to 
understand fully all the results which may grow out of the con- 
test for power between them. Though the construction of the 
principal is conclusive against the joint agent, as between them^ 
such is not the case between him and his associates. They both 
have an equal right of construction, and it would be the duty of 
the agent to bring the subject before the principal to be adjusted 
according to the terms of the instrument of association ; and of 
the principal to submit to such adjustment. In such cases, the 
contract itself is the law, which must determine the relative rights 
and powers of the parties to it. The General Government is a 
case of joint agency, — the joint agent of the twenty-four sovereign 
States. It would be its duty, according to the principles estab- 
lished in such cases, instead of attempting to enforce its con- 
struction of its powers against that of the State, to bring the 
subject before the States themselves, in the only form in which, 
according to the provisions of the Constitution, it can be, by a 
proposition to amend, in the manner prescribed in the instru- 
ment, to be acted on by them in the only mode they can rightfully 
pursue, by expressly granting or withholding the contested power. 
Against this conclusion there can be raised but one objection, that 
the States have surrendered or transferred the right in question. 
If such be the fact, there ought to be no difficulty in establishing it.' 



19 

It seems from these remarks that, accorchng to the Vice- 
President's notion of tlie proper mode of proceeding in a joint 
concern, if one of the principals suspect that the common 
agent is exceeding his powers, it forthwith becomes the duty — 
not of the principal, but — of the agent to submit the doubtful 
question in regard to the construction of his own powers, to the 
consideration of the other principals. The discontented partner 
begins by disclaiming publicly his share of responsibility for 
the acts of the agent. The agent then consults the other 
partners : if a majority of them approve the proceedings of 
the agent, the discontented partner is bound to submit : if not, 
the agent ceases to exercise the disputed jx)wer. Thus, when 
the President and Directors of the Bank of the United States 
employed JMr. Sergeant to perform a certain service for them 
at London, if one of the Directors had happened to hear that 
that gentleman was exceeding his powers, according to the 
construction put upon them by this Director, it would have 
been the duty of the latter to publish the fact in the newspa- 
pers, and to give notice to all the world that he, as one of the 
Directors, would not hold himself responsible for Mr. Sergeant's 
proceedings. The newspaper containing this notice would in 
process of time have reached London, and Mr. Sergeant on 
reading it would have been bound to write to the President 
of the Bank, informing him that he had seen a notice to a 
certain -effect in a Philadelphia paper, and inquiring whether 
he had or had not mistaken the meanrag of his instructions. 
The President, on receiving Mr. Sergeant's letter, would have 
been bound to call together the Board of Directors, and submit 
the subject to their consideration. If the Board, proceeding 
in the usual form of transacting business, had decided that Mr. 
Sergeant had not exceeded his powers, it would have been the 
duty of the discontented Director to v;ithdraw his objections, 
and to give public notice that he was ready to resume his share 
of responsi'bihty. On the other supposition, Mr. Sergeant 
would have ceased to exercise the disputed power. 

Such is the notion entertained by the Vice-President of the 
proper and usual mode of proceeding in a partnership concern. 
Our readers, who are at all familiar with business, will, we 
think, agree with us in the opinion that he has mistaken the 
matter entirely. In the case supposed, a Director of the Bank, 
who had heard of any facts which led him to suppose that Mr. 
Sergeant was exceeding his powers, instead of publishing the in- 
telligence in the newspapers, and making it an occasion for open 



20 

scandal, would have gone quietly to the Bank, and mentioned 
what he had heard in private to the President. The President 
would have submitted the facts to the Directors at their next 
meeting. If the Board, represented by the necessary number 
of members, were satisfied that Mr. Sergeant was in fact exceed- 
ing his powers, the President would have written to him to that 
effect, and the Board would have taken the proper measures for 
remedying any mischief that might have resulted from his mis- 
take. In the other event, the discontented Director would have 
been relieved from his apprehensions. In either case, the affair 
would have passed off quietly, without scandal, and, according 
to our apprehension, in the ordinary and regular way of trans- 
acting business. 

Reasoning therefore analogically, from the relation between 
an agent and his principal in a partnership concern, — the only 
semblance of an argument which the Vice-President offers in 
support of his main position, — we should draw a conclusion of 
a directly opposite character, viz. that instead of proceeding at 
once to nullify and throwing upon the General Government 
the responsibility of bringing the subject before the other 
States, it would be the duty of a discontented State to begin 
by addressing herself in the way of consultation to the other 
States, her co-partners in the great political firm of the Union. 
We have already shown that it would be wholly impracticable 
from the nature of the case for the General Government, be- 
lieving itself, as it does by the supposition, to possess the dis- 
puted power, to adopt any measure implying a contrary opin- 
ion. We have shown that the General Government has no 
authority under the Constitution to adopt such a measure. But 
admitting that it were both constitutional and practicable, what 
propriety would there be in it ? If Carolina conceive that 
she has a right to complain of the proceedings of the common 
agent of the political partnership to which she belongs, and 
think that her partners ought also to attend to the subject, is 
she not perfectly capable of saying to them herself all that is 
necessary or proper on the occasion ? Is it not obvious that the 
agent, who is supposed to be in fault, is the very last person 
who can be depended on to bring the question before the tri- 
bunal which is to decide upon it ? Is it reasonable to expect 
that he will intermeddle in a matter in which he has really 
no concern, for the mere purpose of denouncing himself as a 
usurper of power, not granted by his commission ? Is there 



m 

not a wanton and almost ludicrous absurdity in the very ides, 
of such a proceeding ? And independently of all this, how un- 
graceful in the General Government to apply for an augmen- 
tation of its own powers, and this too at the very momerit 
when it is accused of exceeding them I Is it not apparent, 
that such an application would come with infinitely greater 
propriety from any other quarter ? We can hardly believe that, 
on cool reflection, the Vice-President himself would sanction 
with his final judgment a theory pregnant with so many and 
such various incongruities. 

It would therefore be the duty of the discontented State, 
instead of proceeding to nuUifij and throwing upon the General 
Government the responsibility of bringing the subject before 
the other States, to begin by addressing herself directly to the 
other States in the way of consultation. But in what form is 
this to be done ? The Vice-President tells us, that the subject 
must be brought before the States ' in the only form in which 
according to the Constitution it can be, by a proposition to 
amend in the manner prescribed by that instrument.' But 
how does it appear, that this is the only or the proper form 
in which the business can be done ? The object is to ascev' 
tain the meaning of the Constitution. Why resort for this 
purpose to a process intended for a totally different one, and, 
as we have seen, wholly unsuitable and ineffectual for this? 
Suppose that all the insuperable preliminary objections to 
which we have adverted are overcome ; — that the General 
Government has applied for a grant of the disputed power, and 
that the States, as the Vice-President would of course desire, 
have refused the application ; — how would the case then stand ? 
Precisely as it does now. The question would still be, what is 
the meaning of the Constitution as it is? And after all that 
had taken place, it would still be just as far from a solution as 
before. Instead of resorting to a process intended for another 
purpose, and wholly ineffectual for this, why not employ the 
one which the Constitution provided and organized for this 
special object ? ' The judicial power,' says the Constitution, 
' shall extend to all cases in law^ and equity arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States and the treaties 
made or which shall be made under their authority.' Why 
not submit the question at once to the Supreme Court? This 
is the method by which the States, when they established the 
Constitution, intended that all questions respecting the con- 



22 

Struction of it should be decided. Nor does a resort to this 
method involve, as some suppose, the inconvenience of making 
the General Government the judge of its own powers. The 
Judiciary department, though nominally a branch of the Gene- 
ral Government, is, and was for this express purpose meant and 
made to be, wholly independent of the other branches of that 
Government. It is properly a separate agency, established for 
specific purposes by the same authority which for other 
purposes established the Executive and Legislative branches. 
It has no community of interest, direct or indirect, with these 
branches, and is in all respects the most competent and 
capable, as it is the proper constitutional judge of the extent 
of their powers, as defined by the great charter of the Union. 
But waving this point, upon which we are aware that the 
Vice-President's views would not agree with ours, and admit- 
ting for the moment and for argument's sake, that the Supreme 
Court is not the proper tribunal to decide in this case, the 
question still returns. Why resort to the form provided for mak- 
ing amendments ? This is a form, in which the States act for a 
certain purpose within the pale of the Constitution. But this 
whole process of nullification, — if not, as we believe it to be, 
unconstitutional, — is at least, and is admitted to be by those who 
approve it, eitra-constitutional. The State of Carolina throws 
herself back, (such is the received phrase) upon her reserved 
rights, and undertakes to decide, in her capacity as an independ- 
ent State and a party to the Union, w'hich she considers as a 
confederacy of independent States, whether the compact has 
been faithfully observ^ed. She satisfies herself that it has been 
violated, and she now wishes to ascertain whether the other 
States agree with her in opinion. But how are these States to 
be consulted and to act in this matter ? Obviously in 
the same capacity in which Carolina proposes it. She appears 
in this affair as a sovereign and independent power ; as such 
she must address herself to the other States, and it is only 
in their capacity as sovereign and independent powers, resting 
on their reserved rights, that they can receive and act upon her 
communication. The whole aftair, reasoning of course on the 
principles of the Vice-President, is extrU'ConstitutionaJ. Why 
then resort to a process, intended for the direction of the States 
while acting within the pale of the Constitution for its ordinary 
purposes ? The Vice-Pi"esident, in proposing this course, ob- 
viously forgets his own principles. The true one, on his sys- 



23 

tern, would be very difierent. Having taken her stand upon 
her reserved rights and assumed the attitude of a sovereign 
power, Carohna should exhibit a little more of the lion port and 
awe-commanding face. Instead of resorting to a paltry hu- 
miliating process, which supposes throughout the subordination 
of all the parties concerned in it to the common authority of the 
Union, ouY soi-(Hsant sovereign, in order to be consistent, should 
send ambassadors to all the other States to communicate the 
business in hand. These again, being thus called on, must in 
like manner throw themselves back upon their reserved righis, 
and assume, for the time, the attitude of independent States. If 
a consultative meeting be deemed expedient, it must be a con- 
gress of ambassadors held by arrangement among the States, 
and in which they will appear by their ministers as indepen- 
dent powers. At such a meeting, the rule of deciding ques- 
tions according to the opinion of the majority has of course 
no application. Although three-fourths or even all the States, 
except Carolina, should agree that the compact had not been 
violated, she would still be at liberty as a sovereign power to 
adhere to her ov>n construction, and to hold herself in future ex- 
empt from the obligation imposed by the articles of union. 
Such, as we conceive, is the only process consistent with the 
theory of nullification, which the Vice-President, with submis- 
sion to his better judgment, does not follow out to its proper and 
natural conclusion. We find accordingly that Georgia, v.ho, al- 
though she has said but little about nullification, has, to do her 
justice, practised it for two or three years past with a vigor and 
consistency that rather put to shame the Carolina doctors of the 
science, — having thought proper to consult the other Southern 
States upon the propriety of assembling an anti-Tariff Conven- 
tion, — instead of depending upon the General Government to 
bring the subject before them in the form provided for amend- 
ing the Constitution, forthwith despatches her ambassadors to 
their several seats of Government to communicate her sove- 
reign intentions, where, for aught we know to the contrary, they 
have been carrying on their negotiations up to this day. 

So nuich for the first reason, why the doctrine, that a 
principal has, in ordinary cases, an unlin^ited right to construe 
the powers, and disavow the acts of his agent, — were it 
even true, as we have shown that it is not, — would in no way 
help the Vice-President's argument. Carolina is one of a 
number of principals, composing a partnership concern ; and if 



24 

she have any doubts about the propriety of the proceedings of the 
common agent, her only course is to consult with her co-partners, 
and to acquiesce in the opinion of the majority. But there is an- 
other reason still more substantial, why the doctrine in question, 
even if true, would be of no service to the Vice-President: — a 
reason leading at once to the' heart of the whole argument, of 
which the matters thus far touched upon are merely the ' limbs 
and outward flourishes;' and that is, that a Government^ although 
it may in a certain sense be called an agency, is an agency of 
a peculiar kind, carrying with it rights and obligations, of which 
the nature and extent cannot be deduced by analogy from 
those which are incident to the relation of agent and principal 
in private life, andean only be determined by a correct analysis of 
the structure of society and the original principles of the hu- 
man constitution. 

That the Government of the United States, though de- 
scribed as an agency, is to all intents and purposes a real 
Government, is frankly admitted by the Vice-President himself. 
* In applying the term agent to the General Government, I do 
not intend to derogate in any degree from its character as a 
Government. It is as truly and properly a Government as are 
the State Governments themselves. I have applied it simply 
because it strictly belongs to the relation between the General 
Government and the States, as in fact it does also to that be- 
tween a State and its own Government. Indeed, according to 
our theory, Governments are in their nature hut trusts, and 
those appointed to administer them trustees or agents to exe- 
cute the trust poioers. The sovereignty resides elsewhere, — 
in the people, and not in the Government.' ' The Constitution 
of the United States, with the Government it created, is truly 
and strictly the Constitution of each State, as much so as its 
own particular Constitution and Government, ratified by the 
same authority in the same mode, and having, as far as its 
citizens are concerned, its powers and obligations from the same 
source.' 

In these principles we fully concur, but in laying them 
down in this distinct and unequivocal manner, the Vice-Presi- 
dent has, as w"e humbly conceive, conceded the whole matter 
in controversy, and given up every inch of ground which he had 
to stand upon. If it could be made out that the two Houses of 
Congress, the President, and the various executive and judicial 



25 

officers acting under them, are not a proper Government, but a 
mere agency constitutedby four and twenty mutually independent 
States for certain specific objects, it would follow, not precisely 
that the theory of nullification is true, for this, as we have seen, 
is, at least as stated by the Vice-President in the docunient 
before us, not merely unconstitutional, but in itself essentially 
impracticable, incongruous and absurd : — but that any State 
which might be, for any or no reason, tired of the arrangement, 
would have a perfect right, after such consultation and advise- 
ment with the other parties as might be necessary to secure 
their interests, to revoke its powers. But the moment it is 
admitted that the two Houses of Congress, the President and 
the executive and judicial officers acting under them, — by 
whatever name they may be called, — are a real Government : 
— that the instrument by which they hold their powers is a real 
Constitution, the case changes. By the Constitution of Gov- 
ernment, is meant, in every community, the great social compact 
which binds together the individual members into one body poli- 
tic or political society. Whatever may be its form, character, or 
origin, — whether it be written or unwritten ; — free, limited, or 
despotic ; — whether founded in force, fraud, or voluntary associa- 
tion ; — whether created by a number of previously independent 
States or by a number of previously independent individuals, so 
long as it is and is admitted to be a real Constitution of Gov- 
ernment, it carries with it certain incidents which belong to 
it as such, and which are inseparable from its nature. Of these 
incidents, essential properties or characteristics of the social 
compact, the first in order are that the parties to it have not a 
moral right to withdraw from it at discretion, or to construe at 
discretion the powers of the Government created by it, but are 
bound to remain parties to it, and to acquiesce in the acts of 
the Government created by it, excepting in those extreme cases 
which justify open rebellion. These are principles universally 
acknowledged. No one has ever questioned them ; no one has 
ever undertaken to maintain that the members of a political 
society have a right to withdraw from it at discretion, or that 
the laws of the land are not in ordinary cases binding on the 
citizens. The principle is equally true under all forms of gov- 
ernment, as the Vice-Presldenthimself very correctly intimates, 
when he states that the relation between the General Govern- 
ment and the States is the same with that between the States 
4 



26 

and their own Governments, or in general between all Govern- 
ments and the societies in which they are established. 

Such are the principles which, by universal acknoivledg- 
ment, determine the relations between Governments and the 
political societies in which they exist. When therefore the Vice- 
President fully and formally admits that the two Houses of 
Congress, the President, and the executive and judicial 
officers acting under them are a real Government ; — that the 
instrument by virtue of wdiich they hold their powers is a real 
Constitution OY social compact, \\QZidm\is, — if he choose at the 
same time to describe them as an agency , — that they are an 
agency which the parties that constituted it, whether States or 
individuals, have not a right to revoke at discretion ; an agency 
which construes its own powers, and has a right to enforce its 
own construction of them upon its principals, excepting in the 
extreme cases which justify a v^iolent resistance to the law : 
he admits that nullification is either wholly unjustifiable or jus- 
tifiable only as resistance : he admits, in a word, that nullifica- 
tion, if it have any proper and intelligible meaning at all, is only 
another name for rebellion. This is, in fact, the real truth of 
the whole business. 

And this being the case, it is apparent that, even if the acts 
which the nullifiers propose to perform were justifiable, it 
would be on principles other than those which they profess ; 
that their theory would still be erroneous, and their language in- 
congruous and absurd. In certain extreme cases, the citizen is 
justified in resisting the execution of the law ; but even then 
he has neither the right nor the power to annul or repeal it. 
This is an operation, v/hich from its nature can only be per- 
formed by the same authority which enacted the law, viz : the 
Government of the country. The supposition made by the 
nullifiers, that in certain cases a citizen or a certain number of 
citizens have a right to annul or repeal the law of the land, 
is not merely an error, but a manifest absurdity, involving a 
contradiction in terms. In the cases which justify resistance, 
the principle upon which the citizen proceeds, is not that he 
has a legal or constitutional right to annul or repeal the offen- 
sive law, — which is the doctrine of the nulhfiers, — but that he 
has a right, which he admits to be illegal and unconstitutional, 
but which he claims as a natural one, to make a violent oppo- 
sition to its execution. 



27 

Such is the second reason^why the doctrine that a principal 
has, in ordinary cases, an unhraited right to construe the 
powers and disavow the acts of his agent,— were it even 
true, as we have shown that it is not, — would in no way help 
the Vice-President's argument. The General Government, 
if it he an agency, is an agency of a peculiar kind, which, from 
its nature, is not revocable at the discretion of the parties that 
constituted it, which construes its own pov^ers, and which has a 
right to enforce its construction of them against that of its prin- 
cipals, excepting in those extreme cases that authorize re- 
bellion. 

This, as we have said, is the principal and leading considera- 
tion which governs the whole subject. Once admit, what the 
Vice-President fully recognises, and what no man in his senses 
can deny, tliatthe General Government, call it agency cr what 
you will, is a real Government ; — that the instrument from 
which it derives its power is a real Constiiution or social com- 
jjact, and the ars:ument is brought to a close : there is not a 
woid more to be said about the matter. The acts of the 
Government are, as such, the lavv of the land. This results 
from the nature of tlie case, and is also affirmed in the Constitu- 
tion, which, in order to avoid all doubt or difficulty about the 
point immediately in controversy in the present instance, ex- 
pressly provides that the acts of the General Government 
shall be the Supreme Law of the land, any thing in the Con- 
stitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 
But to say that a citizen, or any number of citizens, can annul 
or repeal the lawtDf the land, is, we repeat, a manifest absurdity. 
Resist it they can, and in certain extreme cases may : but that 
they should annul or repeal it, is a thing not illegal or unconsti- 
tutional, but impossible and unimaginable. The repeal of a law 
is as much an exercise of legislative power as the enactment 
of it, and from its very nature cannot be performed, unless by 
some person or persons invested with that power, in other 
words, by the Government. To assert the contrar)", is in sub- 
stance to assert that the same person can be sovereign and sub- 
ject, or in a {ree State, in and out of office, at one and the 
same time. 

We have thus endeavored, by a few plain considerations, to 
show, first, that the doctrine of nullification is not only unsanc- 
tioned by the Constitution, but wholly impracticable, and that 



28 

its results, if it could be carried into effect, would be of the most 
disastrous character : — secondly, that the only semblance of 
argument, by which the Vice-President attempts to sustain it 
in the document before us, is entirely without foundation. It 
follows from the view which we have taken of the subject, that 
the controversy respecting the origin of the Constitution, 
which has been often agitated in connexion with this question, 
is in a great measure foreign to it. Whether the General Gov- 
ernment had its origin in the will of the State Governments, 
of the people of the States, or of the peojjle of the United States 
is a point of no importance in the present inquiry, for those who 
admit that it is the real and rightful Govcrnynent of the country. 
For those, if any such there be, who wish to establish the pro- 
position that the Union is a confederacy of independent States, 
subject to no common Government, the question of the origin of 
the Constitution is an essential one, because it is in the cir- 
cumstances attending it, that they must look for the proofs of 
their theory. But for those who believe that that instrument 
is a social compact, and the Government created by it a real 
Government, it is unnecessary, for the present purpose, to go 
beyond that fact, which proves, of itself, that its acts are the 
law of the land, and that in respect to them there is no middle 
course between obedience and rebellion. 

As respects the origin of the Constitution, we will therefore 
merely remark, without enlarging on the subject, that we agree 
with the Vice-President in the opinion that it derives its au- 
thority from the States acting as distinct communities, and not 
from the aggregate mass of the people of the United States. 
The latter theory receives some countenance from the open- 
ing words of the preamble: — We the people of the United 
States; — but is obviously inconsistent with the facts attending 
the formation and adoption of the Constitution. Throughout the 
whole proceedings, the States appeared as distinct communities. 
Those States, which did not at first approve the Constitution, 
considered themselves and were considered by the other States 
as at liberty to remain without the pale, and actually did so 
remain for some years. This could not have happened if all 
the States had previously constituted one people, that is, one 
body politic. In that case the decision of the body, in what- 
ever form it might have been collected, must have been obli- 
gatory upon all the members. Indeed, the preceding instru- 



29 

ment of Union, commonly calledthe Old Confederation, express- 
ly recognises the sovereignty and independence of the States, 
and describes the Union as a league. The Congress which 
assembled under this Confederation was not a General Gov- 
ernment, but a meeting of delegates or ambassadors, in which 
each State had an equal vote, and which merely recommended 
to the States the adoption of certain measures, which being 
adopted by them and in that case only, obtained the character 
and force of Imvs. It is obviously impossible to reconcile this 
condition of things with the theory, that the States, at the pe- 
riod immediately preceding the adoption of the Constitution, 
constituted one people. We find accordingly, that President 
J. Q. Adams, who, in his late Fourth of July Oration, pro- 
fesses the doctrine that the acts of Union which preceded the 
declaration of Independence combined the States into one peo- 
ple, and that they never existed as separate sovereignties, 
treats the old Confederation as a temporary departure from the 
true political system of the country. In other words, he ad- 
mits that the character of it is inconsistent with his theory. 
But this Confederation, whatever may be thought of its value, 
undoubtedly determined for the time being the actual relation of 
the parties to it. There is reason to suppose, from the tenor of 
another late publication by Mr. Adams, that he considers the 
union of Great Britain and Ireland as a departure from the 
true political system of those countries ; but he would probably 
not think of maintaining, as a consequence of that opinion, 
that Ireland is at this moment an independent State. On 
our view of the subject, therefore, the States, from the 
period of the Declaration of Independence to that of the 
establishment of the Constitution, existed, in form at least, as 
distinct communities, independent of each other, and, though 
confederated for certain purposes, not subject to a common 
Government. The Constitution, by which they subjected 
themselves to a common Government, was the act which gave 
them the character o^ one people. The form of distinct com- 
munities, under which they existed during the period alhided 
to, may have been, as we agree with President Adams that it 
was, an unfortunate expression of the substantial condition of 
the population of this continent ; but this is a question not of 
substance but of form, and such undoubtedly was, for the time 
being, the form of their political existence. 



30 

We are therefore disposed to agree with the Vice-President 
in the opinion, that the parties to the great social compact, en- 
titled tiie Constitution, were not the individual citizens coin- 
posing the whole people of the United States, but tlie several 
distinct communities into which they are divided, and which were 
at that time, — to use the ordinary language, — sovereign and in- 
dependent States. We may remark en passant that the phrase 
^Sovereign State, which certain persons employ so frequently 
and appear to consider as pregnant with important political 
conclusions, though it may, perhaps, be sufficiently authorized 
by usage to be received as good English, is not, in the strict and 
proper use of language, admissible, and is therefore better 
avoided in all precise and scientific discussion. The word 
sovereig7ih?LS the same etymology with supreme, of which it is 
another form, and properly implies, as that does, comparison 
with something else. Thus the Supreme Being is the highest of 
all beings : the Supreme Court is the highest of all the Courts : 
the Sovereign power in a State is the highest political authority. 
But States, being as such politically independent of each other, 
cannot in the nature of things stand towards each other in the 
relation of superiority or inferiorit)', and can of course be neither 
sovereign nor subject. We find, accordingly, that in the Decla- 
ration of Independence, — a document remarkable throughout 
for great propriety in the use of language,^although it was 
once quoted by Governor Hamilton, on some public occasion, 
as saving that the United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, 
free, sovereign and independent States, the word sovereign is 
not employed. The language used is that the colonies are, 
and of riglit ouglit to be, free and independent States. As 
applied to States, the word sovereign, if it have any meaning 
at all, can only mean indejjendcnt. In this sense it is no longer 
applicable to the several States composing the Union, which, 
since the adoption of a common Government, are not politically 
independent of eacli other. This is not a merely verbal criti- 
cism. Words are things ; and w^e strongly suspect that the 
frequent use of this incorrect, ambiguous, and, — to recur again to 
the langud2;e of Governor Lumpkin, — mystical phrase Sover- 
eign Statc^ has created a good deal of embarrassment, which 
tlie substitution of the more correct and intelligible term inde- 
pendent would have in part prevented. 

To return, however, from this digression : — altliough we 



SI 

agree with the Vice-President in the opinion, that the Con- 
stitution had its origin in the will of the States acting as dis- 
tinct communities, we cannot acquiesce in the conclusions 
which he deduces from tliis fact, or admit that, for the present 
purpose, it makes any difference whatever in the case. Inde- 
pendent States may form themselves into a hody politic, as 
well as independent individuals. Such is in fact the historical 
origin of most of the communities now existing throughout the 
world. They are in general aggregations of smaller commu- 
nities, previously existing in an independent form. Where the 
States, so forming themselves into one body politic, retain for 
certain purposes a distinct name and character, their position 
in the body politic, of which they form a part, is precisely the 
same with that of the individual citizens in an ordinary connnu- 
nity. This, as we have seen, is fully and distinctly admitted 
by Mr. Calhoun himself He admits that the General Gov- 
ernment is as fully and properly a Government as are the 
State Governments themselves, and that the relation between 
the General Government and the States is precisely the same 
with that between the Governments and citizens of the States, or 
in general between the Governments and citizens of any otlier 
community. How^ then can he possibly claim for the States 
a right of annulling the acts of the General Government, when 
he certainly would not think of claiming such a right for the 
citizens of the several States, or of any other political societies, 
in reference to their respective Governments? 

It may be true, as Mr. Calhoun intimates, that a State Gov- 
ernment has no right to enforce its construction of the Consti- 
tution of the State against the people of the State, appearing in 
their sovereign capacity ; or, more generally, that in our theories 
of government the people of any country, acting in their sove- 
reign capacity, have a right to construe, alter or totally des- 
troy the Constitution at discretion. But supposing this to be 
true, would it follow that every individual citizen has a right 
to annul the Constitution, or any part of it, at discretion ? 
Would Mr. Calhoun himself think of drawing such a conclusion, 
in reference to the individual citizens of the States, or of other 
communities? — Undoubtedly not. How then can he with the 
least regard for consistency draw it in reference to thiC indi- 
vidual States, which, as he tells us himself, stand in precisely 
the same relation to the General Government, in which the 



32 

individual citizens of the States and of other communities stand 
in relation to their res}3ective Governments ? 

The right claimed for the States of annulling the Constitu- 
tion and laws of the United States, must, says the Vice-Presi- 
dent, belong to them, unless they have expressly surrendered 
or transferred it. We have already seen, that no member of 
a body politic, whether composed of States or individuals, does 
or can possess a right to annul or repeal the law ; and that 
the contrary proposition involves a contradiction in terms. 
Were the Constitution wholly silent on the subject, the mere 
fact that they had formed themselves, by a solemn social com- 
pact, into one great people, subject to a common Govern- 
ment, though retaining, as distinct communities, no inconsidera- 
ble share of the legislative power, — this fact alone^ we say, 
would have carried with it a peremptory obligation upon the 
States to obey the law as construed by the courts of justice, 
excepting in the extreme cases that justify resistance. It would, 
however, be natural enough for independent States, in forming 
a compact of this description, to introduce an expression of 
this obligation ; and it may be a matter of curiosity to consider 
for a moment what language could have been used, in order to 
express the idea in the most direct and unequivocal manner. 
To one who was seeking for such an expression,^ some such 
phrase as the following would probably occur. No State 
shall have a right, either in the exercise of the sovereign (^con- 
stitution-maTcing ) or the ordinary legislative (laic-mahing) 
27oiver, to annul or arrest the execution of this Constitution, or 
any law made in pursuance of it hy the General Govei~nment. 
This, we say, or something like it would probably be the lan- 
guage, which would occur to any one who was seeking for 
the most direct and unequivocal expression of the idea, that 
the States have no right to set up their authority against that 
of the General Government. Now the language of the Con- 
stitution on this subject is still more decisive, because it expresses 
the same ideas conveyed by that here supposed in two forms, the 
one positive and the other negative. This Constitution, and 
the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof and all treaties made or which shall he made under 
the authority of the United States y shall he the supreme law 
of the land. This positive declaration carries with it, as we 
have said, by implication, the full import of the negative one 
which we have supposed above : but in order to make assur- 



33 

ance douhly sure, the framers of the Constitution added a neg- 
ative declaration, which, though more concise than the one we 
have supposed, is of precisely the same meaning ; and the judges 
in every State shall be bowul thereby, any thing in the Consti- 
tution or laivs of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 
This declaration, we repeat, though more concise, is equivalent 
in meaning to the more extended expression of the same idea, 
which we have imagined as the most direct and unequivocal that 
could possibly be used. — Any thing in the laios of any State 
to the contrary notwithstanding. — No State, in the exercise 
of its ordinary law-making power, shall have a right to an- 
nul or arrest the execution of this Constitution, or the laws made 
in pursuance thereof by the United States. Any thing in the 
Constitution of any State to the contrary notivithstanding. 
— No State, in the exercise of her sovereign or constitu- 
tion-making power ; no State, acting in her sovereign ca- 
pacity, shall have a right to annul or arrest the execution 
of this Constitution, or the laws made in pursuance thereof 
by the United States. Any act that may be done for this 
purpose is to be, ipso facto, null and void. The judges 
shall 7iot be bo%ind by it. Will the Vice-President or any 
person of plain common sense undertake to say, that this is not 
a correct paraphrase of the negative clause in the Constitution ? 
If it be admitted that it is, will the Vice-President or any man 
of plain common sense undertake to say, that if the framers of 
the Constitution had employed the language of this paraphrase 
instead of the concise equivalent phrase which they used, there 
could be any doubt respecting the character of the present 
proceedings in Carolina ? There is, in fact, no doubt about 
it. 

It is painful to see a person so distinguished for talent, and, 
as we have hitherto been willing to beheve, for uprightness of 
purpose, as Mr. Calhoun is, attempting to escape by a side 
path from the plain and obvious meaning of this clause, which 
he shrinks from meeting in the face. He alludes to several pro- 
positions that had previously been submitted to the Convention 
which framed the Constitution, for tlie purpose of making the 
acts of the General Government paramount to those of the 
States; and because these were rejected, he concludes, that the 
one which was adopted is not to be carried into effect accord- 
ing to its plain and natural sense. Is this fair argument? Is it 
even plausible ? It is impossible, within the narrow compass 
5 



84 

of an article, to go fully into every part of this vast subject ; 
but any one, who will take the trouble to examine the proceed- 
ings of the Convention, will readily see why they rejected the 
first propositions, and why they adopted the last. As the 
States retain a very considerable portion of the legislative 
power, and remain, for many purposes, distinct communities, it 
was thought important that, in regard to the exercise of the 
powers so retained, they should not be under the formal control 
of the General Government : — in other words, that so far as they 
were sovereign, they should not be subject. Hence the rejec- 
tion of tlie proposal of General Hamilton to give the Presi- 
dent a negative on all State laws ; and hence subsequently the 
amendment of the Constitution, by which it was orclained that 
no State should be sued at law. This was all perfectly 
proper : but it was also essential that the paramount authority 
of the acts of the General Government should be secured, 
and the object was attained by the proposition finally adopted, 
which declares distinctly, both in a ])ositive and negative form, that 
such is the understanding of the Convention, and leaves it to the 
Courts of Justice to enforce the provision. This plan is just 
as eftectual as the other would have been, because the decisions 
of the courts may and must be sustained, if the occasion require 
it, by the whole military force of the country ; while at the same 
time it removes the possibility of any actual collision between 
the two law-giving powers, in the regular performance of their 
functions. Each exercises a complete and uncontrolled dis- 
cretion as to the objects and extent of its own legislation ; — 
puts its own construction upon its own powers ; — passes, in 
short, any laws which it deems constitutional and expedient. 
Neither, in this form of action, has any control over the 
proceedings of the other. — The General Government has no 
more riglit to annul an act of the State of South Carolina, 
than the State of South Carolina has to annul an act of the 
General Government. But when the proceedings of the two 
powers come into collision, — as it may well be supposed that, 
under such circumstances, they occasionally vvill, — the silent 
operation of the Courts of Justice gives the ascendancy, where 
the Constitution declares that it belongs, to those of the 
General Government. The provision, like most others in the 
Constitution, is obviously the simplest and best that could have 
been adopted. The rejection of other propositions of similar 
tendency only proves that the Convention considered the sub- 



35 

ject very maturely, and successively laid aside the several 
imperfect and inexpedient methods of effecting the great ob- 
ject in question, which were proposed to them, until they finally 
hit upon one that was satisfactory. 

In alluding to this decisive clause in the Constitution, the 
Vice-President omits entirely the negative part of it, and quotes 
it in the following form: — IViis Consiituiion and the Imvs 
made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Jatv of the 
land. He then adds that he shall not go into a minute exam- 
ination of its effect, the subject having been already so fre- 
quently fuid so ably investigated, that he deems it unnecessary. 
This nright have been a good reason for not discussing it at all ; 
but if it was expedient to discuss it at all, it seems hardly 
proper that the most material point in the argument should be 
passed over in silence. The omission looks very much like 
conscious weakness. For ourselves, we have met with no 
suggestion, whether made on this or any former occasion, 
which, according to our views, has thrown even the shadow of 
a doubt upon the meaning of the passage. The pretext for a 
question would probably be sought in the qualification, made in 
pursuance of the Constitution. It may be said that, under 
this qualification, laws not made in pursuance of the Constitu- 
tion are not paramount to those of the States. But this phrase 
has obviously no bearing on the point in question. The mean- 
ing is, that the Constitution and the laws of the United States, 
made-m the manner prescribed by it, ov for the pur-pose of car- 
rying it into effect, shall be the paramount law of the land, 
just as in the other part of the phrase it is said, that treaties 
made under the authority of the United States shall also form a 
part of this paramount law. In both cases, there is no refer- 
ence to the question, whether the law or the treaty has been 
made in a rightful or wrongful exercise of the legislative or 
treaty-making power. It is merely affirmed that the acts of the 
General Government, performed in the exercise of their pow- 
ers undef the Constitution, are paramount to those of the 
States. The same language is used in the Ordinance of Nul- 
lification, which declares that 'this Ordinance and the laws rnade 
■in pursuance thereof b}^ the legislative power of the State, 
shall be binding on the citizens.' It is obviously not intended, 
that the citizen shall judge for himself whether the laws so 
made are or are not agreeable to the tenor of the Ordinance, 
bat merely that the laws which the assembly, — acting under 



36 

this Ordinance or in consequence of the recommendation con- 
tained in tliis Ordinance, — ma}' pass, shall be obl!,2;atory. 

This qualification, which has sometimes, we believe, been 
regarded as very significant, has therefore no bearing on the 
point in question, nor is it, as Mr. Calhoun imagines, by the 
clause conferring on the Supreme Court the power of deciding 
in all cases arising under the Constitution, that the States are 
supposed to be deprived of their right of putting their own 
construction upon the powers of the General Government. 
The right of deciding on the constitutionality of the laws of the 
United States, belongs, from the nature of the case, to the courts, 
and is expressly given to the Supreme Court by the Constitu- 
tion ; but the possession of this right by the courts does not carry 
with it that of deciding, that an act of the General Government 
is of paramount authority to one of a State. On this subject, 
we are quite surprised at the looseness of the Vice-President's 
reasoning, and its apparent inconsistency with the general scope 
of his doctrine. ' Where there are two sets of rules,' he remarks, 
' prescribed in reference to the same subject, one by a higher 
and the other hy an inferior authority, the judicial tribunal 
called on to decide the case, must unavoidably determine, 
should they conflict, which is the law ; and that necessarily 
compels it to decide that the rule prescribed by the inferior 
power, if, in its opinion, inconsistent with that of the higher, is 
void.' — This doctrine is strange indeed in the mouth of the 
Prince of nullifiers and great champion of State Sovereignty. 
Where, we would ask, has the Vice-President learned that the 
State Governments are inferior and the General Government 
a superior power ? — We must inform him, that without being 
nullifiers, and without believing in the doctrine of State Sove- 
reignty, we make no such admission for Massachusetts. The 
State and General Governments, each of which exercises, 
independently of the other, a portion of the sovereign or 
legislative power of the people, are neither superior nor inferior 
to each other: they are precisely on a level. The right 
of deciding on the constitutionality of the acts of the General 
Government would no more of itself authorize the judges to 
decide that they are paramount to those of the States, 
than it would authorize them to decide that the acts of the 
States are paramount to those of the General Government. 
The two Governments, considered as distinct legislative powers, 
are on a footing of perfect equality. The question, which shall 



37 

prevail when their acts come into collision, must be decided 
by the nature of the case, and by the specific provisions of the 
Constitution. It follows, from the nature of the case, tliat ti.e 
acts of the General Government, which represents the body 
politic of which all the States are members, must have an au- 
thority paramount to any other existing in the community ; 
and this conclusion is confirmed by the letter of the Constitu- 
tion, which expressly declares, in so many words, that the acts 
of the General Government are paramount to those of the 
States. It was by forming themselves into one body politic, 
and by expressly stipulating with each other in the compact 
by which this body politic was formed, that the acts of the 
General Government representing it should be paramount to 
their own, that the States surrendered the right of putting 
their own construction on the powers of the General Govern- 
ment; and this is the foundation of the authority possessed 
by the judges, when, by virtue of a different clause, they take 
cognisance of cases arising under the Constitution, to decide, 
as they undoubtedly must and would do, that any act of a State, 
whether in its sovereign or legislati^ e capacity, pretending to 
annul an act of the General Government, is of itself, ijjso facto, 
null and void. 

Finally, says the Vice-President, ' it belongs to the authority 
which imposes an obligation, to declare its extent, as far as tliose 
are concerned on whom the obligation is placed. The obliga- 
tion upon the individual citizens of the United States to obey 
the laws, results from the acts of their respective States, by 
which they became parties to the Union ; and a similar act of 
the same authority declaring the extent of the obligation must 
be of equal authority, and of course releases the citizen from the 
obligation which he came under, by the effect of the former 
one.' 

This is a point of great importance. It is here admitted, 
that the individual citizens are under an obligation to obey the 
law which the State is attempting to annul; but it is affirmed, 
that they may be discharged from this obligation by an act 
of the State annulling the law, hecause the same authority which 
imposed the obligation upon them has a right to release them 
from it. It is a matter of high concern for all who wish to 
know, and knowing, mean to perform their duties, to inquire 
how far this principle is true, or, if true, applicable to the 
present case. 

The same authority which imjposes an ohligation must of 



38 

M'c^ssity possess the right of dispensing with it, or dedarm^ 
its extent. This principle, properly explained, may be received 
as true-. But what is the authority which imposes the obliga- 
tion, — for example, to execute a contract? Does the Vice- 
President suppose that it is the ivill of the parties who make 
the contract, and that the same will which brought each of 
them under the obligation, can, at any time, release him from 
it ? Does he suppose, for examplcj that it is the will of the two 
parties to a contract of marriage which imposes upon them the 
obligations incident to that contract, and that either party can, 
by a mere act of the will, exempt him or herself from these 
obligations ? We are quite sure, that Mr. Calhoun would not 
himself think of maintaining a doctrine so monstrous. What 
then is the authority which imposes the obligation ? The 
answer is plain. The authority Imposing the obligation is the 
one which makes the law, from which the obligation results. 
In oi'dinary cases, wiien the obligation results from the laws of 
the land, the authority imposing it is the Government of the 
country. In the case of contracts between parties not subject 
to the same Government, the obligation results from the moral 
law, and is imposed by the will of the great Lawgiver of the 
Universe. The present is the case of an obligation resulting 
from the law of the land. The citizens of South Carolina are 
bound to pay the duties required by the existing Tarifi', be- 
cause it is a part of the law of the land. They were brought 
under the obligation to obey the laws of the United States, by 
the act of the State of South Carolina, by which she and twelve 
other States formed themselves into one body politic, under a 
common Government, just as an individual is brought under 
the obligations resulting from a contract of marriage, by his own 
will to enter into it. But the authority imposing the obliga- 
tion is In both cases not tlie v>ill of the party, but the Govern- 
ment of the country. The Government has the same right to 
repeal or alter the law which il had to enact It, and in this sense 
the principle Is true, that the same authority which imposes 
the obligation, has a right to dispense with it or to declare its 
extent. But the citizens of South Carolina, whether in their 
individual or joint capacity, have no more right to exempt 
thejnselves, by any act of their own, from the obligation to obey 
the laws which they have come under by adopting the Con- 
stitution, or to declare Its extent, than they have to exempt 
themselves by their own act from the obligation to support their 
wives and children, which they have come under by entering 



39 

Into contracts of marriage. Nor does it make any difference 
that the act, by which the citizens of Carohna became parties 
to the social compact, was performed by them in their joint 
and not in their individual capacity. There are many cases, 
in which individuals are brought under obligations of various 
kinds by acts partly or entirely independent of their own will. 
A child is brought under the obligations which he owes to his 
parents by an act of theirs, over which he had no control. 
Will it be pretended that they have a right to relieve him from 
these obligations, or to determine their extent? A husband is 
liable for his wife's debts, — a principal is bound by the acts of 
his agents, — a ward by those of his guardian : — will it be pre- 
tended that the wife, the agent, the guardian has, either in law 
or morals, a dispensing or interpreting power over the obligations 
which they have brought upon other individuals by their acts? 
No person of sound mind could hazard so extravagant an asser- 
tion. Just as preposterous would it be to imagine, that because 
the citizens of Carolina were brought under their obligation to 
obey the laws by an act of the State, that is, of themselves in their 
joint capacity, they have therefore a right, acting in their joint 
capacity, to exempt themselves individually from this obligation. 
Common sense revolts at the suggestion. It is really wonder- 
ful, that principles so palpably erroneous should be depended on 
by a man like Mr. Calhoun, as a justification for measures 
of such transcendent importance and fearful tendency. 

The principle that the same authority which imposes an ob- 
ligation may dispense with or determine its extent is therefore, 
rightly understood, a true and salutary one: but instead of 
sustaining the Vice-President's doctrine, it completely refutes 
the very point which it was employed to establish. The au- 
thority which imposes upon the citizen the obligation to pay the 
duties is the Government of the country ; and the same authority 
only can, by repealing or modifying the law, release him from 
this obligation, or in any way affect its character. 

We have thus adverted, somewhat in detail, to the principal 
points in the Vice-President's exposition, and have endeavored 
to show that the doctrine of nullification is, upon the face of it, 
unconstitutional, impracticable and of ruinous tendency, and 
that there is no solid foundation for the few considerations of 
an argumentative character, by which Mr. Calhoun has en- 
deavored to support it. Before taking leave of the subject, it 
may be proper to notice some views of a rather more general 



40 

description which occupy a considerable portion of his letter, 
and are evidently regarded by its author as highly interesting 
and important. 

It has often been objected, and as we conceive with great 
justice, to the pretensions of the Carolina politicians, that they 
contradict the acknowledged principle of republican Govern- 
ment, that the will of the majority should govern. That one 
State should undertake to annul the proceedings of the whole 
twenty-four, is a thing plainly at variance with this received 
and salutary axiom. In attempting to reply to this objection, 
the Vice-President takes a distinction between what he 
calls ahsolute and conairring majorities. By the former, 
he understands the numerical majority of the citizens taken 
in the aggregate; by the latter, a majority of the different 
sections, classes or interests into which they are divided. The 
absolute majority has, as lie conceives, a constant disposition 
to encroach upon the rights of the minority ; and in order to 
protect the sections or interests of which the minority is com- 
posed, it is important that each of these sections or interests 
should have a voice, as such, in the administration of the Gov- 
ernment. In this country the distinct sections or interests are 
chiefly the States ; and the doctrine of nullification, in au- 
thorizing a single State to arrest the action of all the rest, al- 
though it contravenes the principle of the absolute, is in perfect 
accordance with that of the concurring majority. This latter 
principle is recognised, according to the Vice-President, in the 
political institutions of most of the free States of all periods. 
He cites particularly the case of Rome, where the tribunes, re- 
presenting the Plebeian class, had a negative upon the acts of 
the Senate. In this country, he conceives it to have been the 
intention of the framers of the Constitution, that the principle 
of the absolute majority should prevail in the ordinary business 
of administration, and that of the concurring majority in all 
questions belonging to the formation, amendment or construc- 
tion of the Constitution. This is the great secret of the ' so- 
lidity and beauty of our admirable system ; ' and the doctrine of 
nullification, which proceeds upon this principle, instead of 
having a tendency to weaken this system, on the contrary 
confirms and carries it into effect in one of its most essential 
and salutary provisions. 

To reasoning of this kind, — were it even more specious and 
plausible than this in our opinion is, — it would be a sufHcient 



41 

atiswer, that it is entirely of an abstract and speculative charac- 
ter, and affords of course no proper basis for important political 
action. It is, in fact, one of the most curious circumstances 
in this affair, that the leading Southern politicians have through- 
out founded their pretensions, and predicated the measures they 
recommend on principles, economical and political, not only 
wholly theoretical and vague, but before unheard of, broached 
by themselves for the first time, and repugnant to the received 
opinions of the whole practical and scientific world. Such is 
their doctrine, that the producer and not the consumer pays 
the taxes : — such is this of absolute and concurring majorities. 
The very language employed is entirely new. The phrase 
concurring majority, which, taken separately, is wholly unin- 
telligible, and when explained as it is, involves a contradiction 
in terms, was, as far as we are informed, invented by Mr. Cal- 
houn. Now we put it in perfect sincerity to the conscience 
of that gentleman and his political friends to say, whether it is 
fair and reasonable to expect, that the people of the United 
States will adopt instantaneously as a rule of action in the most 
important concerns, the new theories that may occur to a few 
citizens, however distinguished, in their abstract speculations 
on the sciences of politics and political economy. We cheer- 
fully give full credit to the discoverers of these hitherto un- 
heard of principles, for their talents, ingenuity and research, 
and should always listen with great attention to the suggestions 
they might make ; but we cannot consent to receive them at 
once, and without reflection or examination, as infallible guides 
for conduct or even opinion. Before an abstract principle, 
however plausible it may appear, can be safely adopted as a 
basis of action in important matters, whether public or private, 
it must for a long time be canvassed, examined, opposed and de- 
fended, until it is finally admitted into the number of acknow- 
ledged and popular truths. We find, accordingly, that in the 
British Parliament, which affords the most illustrious example 
of deliberative legislation, no appeal is ever made to abstract 
principles, even such as are generally admitted. The argu- 
ment turns entirely upon precedent and plain common sense. 
During the last fifteen or twenty years, propositions have been 
repeatedly made in the House of Commons of measures pre- 
dicated on the pretended discoveries of Malt bus, in regard to 
the law of population. But, although the belief in his 
6 



42 

doctrines was at one time nearly universal, and was probably 
shared by most of the members of Parliament, no measures pre^ 
dicated upon them could ever be got through. The event has 
fully justified this caution, the doctrine in question being now al- 
most as universally rejected as it was at one time admitted. In the 
French Chambers, there is a greater disposition to abstract spec- 
ulations, but the reference is always, in form at least, to ac- 
knowledged and received principles. No individual, as far as 
we are informed, ever undertook even there to broach an en- 
tirely new theory upon any subject, and demand,^ at the same 
moment, that it should be made the basis of immediate pro- 
ceedings of the highest moment. To do this was reserved for 
the statesmen of the Carolina school, and they have done it 
at every stage in the progress of this business. At the very 
outset, Mr. McDuffie one fine morning rises in the House of 
Representatives, and, after entertaining his colleagues with a 
dissertation on the abstract principles of political economy, con- 
cludes by saying to them, — 'Gentlemen, all this is entirely new: 
nobody ever heard of it before ; it is directly opposed to all 
the received opinions on this subject; Adam Smith, Say, 
Ricardo, Hamilton, Gallatin know nothing about it, but so it 
is ; — ipse dixi; — I have said it, and you will of course act upon 
it, and change at once the whole basis of your economical 
legislation.' The majority, as might naturally have been ex- 
pected, decline complying with this polite proposal. This 
refusal is the intolerable grievance, of which the Carolina gen- 
tlemen are now complaining. What shall be the remedy ? — At 
this point Mr. Calhoun in his turn takes the field, with an en- 
tirelv new theory on the principles of the Constitution ; for the 
very statement of which he is obliged to invent new forms of 
language, and which goes to nothing less than giving to one 
member of the body politic a right of controlling the action of 
all the rest. Novel, dangerous as, on the face of it, it is, this 
speculation too must be made the basis of immediate action : 
and sorry we are to say, that its author has found, in his own 
State, a majority of the community prepared to act upon it. 
For ourselves, we cannot recognise such a mode of proceed- 
ing as judicious, customary, or at all admissible in the prac- 
tical administration of a wise and great people. 

This being the true answer to this part of Mr. Calhoun's 
argument, it is unnecessary to go at length into an examina- 
tion of the doctrine of absolute and concurring majorities. 



43 

We shall therefore merely remark that it is, as far as we have 
considered it, as incorrect and unsubstantial, as it is novel. 
It is important, no doubt, that the respective interests of the 
various territorial, professional, religious and other sections of 
society should be, as far as may be convenient, represented in 
the administration of the Government. This was the first rude 
form, in which the great modern discovery of the principle of 
Representation in Government dawned upon the minds of our 
European ancestors. The idea was acted upon in the polit- 
ical assemblies of the middle ages, denominated States Gen- 
eral and Parliaments, in which the nobles, the clergy, the cities, 
the commons, and in some cases the peasants had each a sepa- 
rate representation. But in these and all other similar cases, 
the object was to obtain a concurrence of the different classes 
of society in making the law: nor do we believe that any ex- 
ample can be produced, either from ancient or modern history, 
with perhaps the single exception of the Confederations of Po- 
land, in which the Constitution, written or unwritten, that is, 
the form prescribed by express agreement or usage for making 
the law, expressly authorizes any individual citizen or class of 
citizens to break the lav/.. The idea is obviously self-contra- 
dictory and absurd. The case of the tribunes at Rome, to 
which the Vice-President alludes, is not in point. The tribunes 
possessed, bylaw, a negative upon the acts of the Senate, pre- 
cisely as the President of the United States and the Gov- 
ernors of all the States possess a qualified negative upon the 
acts of Congress, and the State Legislatures. An act of the 
Roman Senate, which was negatived by a tribune, never be- 
came a law, and of course could not be nullified. 

In our Constitution, the idea of representing different inter- 
ests in the machinery for making the law, has been retained 
in favor of the States. These, independently of their repre- 
sentation on the principle of the numerical amount of their pop- 
ulation in the House of Representatives, have a distinct repre- 
sentation on a footing of perfect equality in the Senate. A 
bill, which has obtained the sanction of the two Houses of 
Congress, has ips& facto been approved by a representation of 
the absolute majority of the whole people of the Union, and 
of what the Vice-President is pleased to call the concurring 
majority, that is, a majority of the representatives of the States, 
considered as distinct communities. The arrangement is one, 
which the Vice-President, reasoning consistently upon his own 



44 

theory, ought to consider as perfect. But this does not satisfy 
him. Not content with obtaining for each of and all the States a 
full representation, on the principle both of the absolute and 
concurring majorities, — the very thing which he professes to 
wish for, — he insists that each shall have in addition for itself 
a right to breaJc the law, which it has itself concurred in mak- 
ing : — that each State, after co-operating by its presence in im- 
posing upon the other States the obligations resulting from a law, 
has a right to exempt itself by its own separate act from 
bearing its own share of these burdens ; and, — as the rights of all 
the States in this respect are of course the same, — that the law, 
which is in form binding upon every body, is in fact and in 
reahty binding upon nobody, since each of the parties supposed 
to be bound by it possesses individually a right to break it. 
— A right to break the law ! 

This is really too extravagant, and were it not for the re- 
spect which we have heretofore been disposed to entertain 
for the talents and character of Mr. Calhoun, we should find 
some difficulty in believing that he can be honest in express- 
ing such opinions. The case furnishes a very strong example 
of the extent, to which party feeling and disappointed personal 
ambition can bewilder the conceptions of a naturally acute and 
powerful mind, li^ the Vice-President will review his prin- 
ciples, with only a small portion of the sagacity and correctness 
of judgment which he could bring to any other subject, he 
will see at once that the right which he claims for the States, 
is not that of being represented as distinct interests in the mak- 
ing of the law, (which they are by the Constitution) but that 
o{ resisting the execution of it, when made ; and that the pro- 
ceedings in which he is engaged, whether justifiable or not, are 
essentially revolutionary. 

The Vice-President indulges in another course of remarks 
of considerable extent, which, though not directly applicable 
to the leading points of the argument, are of too serious a cast 
to be passed over without notice. He undertakes to show, 
that the Government of the Union would not be authorized to 
employ force against a State which should annul one of their 
acts; and, anticipating the objection that nullification is equiva- 
lent to a secession from the Union, which would place the 
seceding State in the attitude of a foreign one, he proceeds to 
reply to it by pointing out what he considers the distinction 
between nullijication and secession. Secession is the actual 



45 

retirement of one of the partners to a common concern ; nullV 
fication is the refusal of the same partner to be bound by an 
act of the common agent. The object of the former is to 
dissolve the partnership, — of the latter, to confine it to its proper 
object. The right to secede, that is, to avoid the obligation 
of all the acts of the partnership, supposes the right to nullify, 
that is, to avoid the obligation of one : and there is therefore 
an obvious inconsistency in the theory of those, who, as the Vice- 
President tells us is the case with many persons, admit the for- 
mer and deny the latter. For himself, he liberally concedes both.: 
a State, according to him, has a right at discretion either to ex- 
empt itself by its own act from the obligation to obey any partic- 
ular act of the General Government, or to nullify the whole. 
Constitution and all, at one fell swoop, and secede entirely 
from the Union. 

Presented in this crude, unsophisticated and unqualified 
■shape, the system of the Vice-President becomes almost ludi- 
crous ; but when we recollect the respectability of the quarter 
from which it proceeds, and the serious aspect which the practice 
upon it is assuming at the South, a painful feeling irresistibly 
predominates. Did Mr. Calhoun, when he was entering on these 
forbidden speculations, recollect the impressive language in 
which the Father of his country, forty years ago, pointed out 
their danger ? ' It Is of infinite moment, that you should prop- 
erly estimate the value of your national Union to your collec- 
tive and individual happiness ; that you should cherish a cordial, 
habitual and immoveable attachment to it ; accustoming your- 
selves to think and speak of it as the palladium of your political 
safety and prosperity ; discountenancing whatever may suggest 
even a suspicion that it can in any event he abandoned ; and 
indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to 
alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble 
the sacred ties which now link together its various parts.' Is 
it discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that 
the Union can in any event he abandoned, to affirm explicitly 
and without qualification, that every State has a right at its own 
discretion to secede from the Union ? Is it froivning indig- 
nantly upon the first dawning of every attempt to enfeeble the 
sacred ties which- link together the United States, to maintain 
that these links are a mere cobweb, which any one of the States 
has a right to break through or shake off at its own discretion ? 
Is this a fit and proper lesson to come from the high places of 



46 

the Federal Government, from the second in rank of the citi- 
zens who have been selected from the whole country, as the 
immediate executors of the great charter of the Union? We 
agree with Mr. Calhoun, that of the two heresies to which he 
alludes, the greater includes and supposes the less : — that it would 
be inconsistent for any one, who admits the right of nullifying 
at once, by secession, the Constitution and all the laws, to deny 
the right of nullifying one ; but we utterly deny that either 
can be reconciled w4th the letter or spirit of the Constitution. 
The social compact, — like the contract of iiiarriage, — is one in 
which the parties take each other for better or worse, for 
sickness or health, for life and for death. It is one from which 
they have no right to retire at discretion. They can have no 
right, as States or individuals, to avoid, either wholly or 
in part, the obligations of this compact, and the laws made under 
it, for the plain and unanswerable reason, that this compact and 
the laws made under it are the rule which determines for 
them what is right, and that opposition to the rule of right 
must of course be wrong. Extreme cases may undoubtedly 
occur, in wdiich the obligation may, either wholly or in part, be 
innocently avoided ; but they cannot, from the nature of the 
subject, be either contemplated in or reconciled with the law. 
The patriot shrinks from dwelling upon the circumstances 
under which they would happen, as he would from imagin- 
ing a case, that should justify him in lifting his hand 
against his own father. His heart sickens at the thought that 
any such contingency can possibly occur. If forced to meet 
it, he makes no vain attempt to reconcile his conduct with the 
rule which he violates ; no pretension to obey and break the 
law at one and the same time : — he boldly avows that his act 
is unconstitutional, and appeals for its justification to the Su- 
preme Governor of the Universe, who has engraved upon the 
heart of man a law which, in some extreme cases, he is per- 
mitted to regard as paramount to every other. 

We have now finished what we thought it necessary to say 
in the way of direct commentary upon Mr. Calhoun's exposition. 
On the leading points of the question, w^e have argued chiefly 
from his admission, which is made in the fullest and most ex- 
plicit manner, that the United States are under a common Gov- 
ernment, holding the same relation towards them that the 
Governments of the several States and all others hold to the 
communities over which they are respectively established. 



47 

From the fact thus admitted, it follows, of necessity, as 
we have repeatedly remarked, that the Constitution is not a 
league or treaty, but a social compact, and that the Union is 
not a cluster of twenty-four independent States, but one body 
politic composed of twenty-four members, — each exercising a 
certain portion of the legislative or sovereign power, but having 
no pretension to independence. If this admission had been made 
unguardedly by Mr. Calhoun, and were not assented to by other 
champions of the same creed, it would be unfair to take advan- 
tage of it in the argument ; but this is not the case. This ex- 
position by the Vice-President is recognised by the nullifiers 
as the most authentic statement that has yet appeared of their 
sentiments, and is constantly referred to as the standard and 
symbol of the true nullifying faith. Other writers of high 
authority on the same subject hold the same language with the 
Vice-President, particularly the authors of the addresses issued 
by the late Columbia Convention. The Report, attributed 
to Mr. McDuffie, declares that ' the States entered into a solemn 
compact with each other, by which they established a General 
Government j' and quotes in support of his position the remark 
of Mr. Jefferson, that the States, by a compact, under the style 
and title of the Constitution of the United States, constituted a 
General Government. In like manner Mr. Turnbull, in his ad- 
dress to the people of South Carolina, tells them that ' the Con- 
stitution of the United States is admitted by contemporaneous 
writers to be a compact between (formed by) sovereign States, 
and that the subject matter (object) of that compact was a 
Government.^ Finally, General Hayne, in the address to the 
people of the United States, remarks that the 'Constitution is 
a compact formed between the several States, acting as distinct 
communities, and that the Government created by it is a joint 
agency of the States.' They all pursue the same line of rea- 
soning with the Vice-President, frequently quote his language, 
and evidently consider his writings as the creed of the party. 
So far, indeed, is the admission to which we have alluded from 
being made by the Vice-President unguardedly or unintention- 
ally, that in other parts of his exposition he in fact goes by 
necessary implication a great deal farther. He not only re- 
cognises the existence of a common Government, and conse- 
quently of one body politic, but lays it down as one of the 
leading points of his doctrine, that this body politic has unlimi- 
ted power ovex \i?> members, the States. Strange as it may 



48 

appear to readers who have not looked attentively at the suB" 
ject, it is actually one of the leading articles of the nullification 
creed, as expounded by the Vice-President in the document 
before us, that the United States are a body politic, possessing 
under the Constitution unlimited power over all its members, 
A State nullifies an act of the General Government ; the Gene- 
ral Government is then bound to apply to the States for a- 
grant of the disputed power, in the form prescribed for amend- 
ing the Constitution. — If three-fourths of the States grant the 
power, — what follows ? The nullifying State is bound to ac- 
quiesce. ' If granted,' says the Vice-President, ' acquies- 
cence would then become a duty on the part of the State.' 
No matter how large the concession ,■ — no matter how important 
the alteration made in the character of our institutions, — should 
the General Government even claim a right to exercise all the 
powers of an unlimited mihtary despotism, let but the change be 
proposed and carried through in the form of an amendment of 
theConstitutionyandthe individual States are bound to acquiesce! 

And yet these States, who have not only formed themselves 
into one body politic under a common Government, to which 
they have delegated the most important powers that are exer- 
cised by other Governments, but who have bound themselves 
to each other to acquiesce in any extension of these powers that 
may be agreed upon by three-fourths of the number, remain 
nevertheless as completely sovereign and independent, since 
the conclusion of the compact containing these provisions, as 
they were before I 

In what way the characters of sovereignty and independence 
are to be reconciled with the obligation, not only to obey a 
Government possessing certain specified powers, but to ac- 
quiesce in any extension of these powers that may be agreed 
upon by certain other parties, without the consent of the sup- 
posed sovereign and independent State, neither the Vice-Presi- 
dent, nor Gov. Hamilton, nor Gen. Hayne, nor Mr. McDuf- 
fie, nor Mr. Turnbull, nor any other writer on the subject 
of nullification has condescended to inform us. They all 
freely admit, that the States are bound in ordinary cases to 
obey the laws made by the General Government : — that even 
in the particular cases where they have a right to nullify these 
laws, they are bound to submit to the decision of three-fourths 
of the States ; and that in general they are bound to acquiesce in 
any extension of the powers of the General Government, that 



49 

may be agreed upon without or against their consent by three- 
fourths of the States ; but still maintain with one voice and 
an air of honest wonder that any body can differ from them, 
that each State is still, to all intents and purposes, as com- 
pletely sovereign and independent, as before the adoption of the 
Constitution. ' The several States,' says the Report of the 
Columbia Convention, ' retain their sovereignty unimpaired.' 
' The States are as sovereign now,' says the address to the 
people of Carolina, ' as they were prior to entering into the 
compact.' It is admitted that ' Si foreign or inattentive reader, 
{Qii: Is Mr. Turnbull a native citizen?) unacquainted with 
the origin, progress and history of the Constitution, would be 
very apt, from the phraseology of the instrument, (a pretty good 
ground, one would think, for argument upon its meaning) to 
regard the States as having divested themselves of their sove- 
reignty, and to have become (regard to have become, is not 
good English, Mr. Turnbull) great corporations, subordinate 
to one Supreme Government.' 'But this,' it seems, 'is 
(would be) an error.' ' The Federal Constitution is a treaty, 
a confederation, an alliance,' the parties to which are ' so many 
sovereign States.' General Hayne, in like manner, describes 
the States, in the address to the people, as ' the sovereign States 
of the confederacy.' ' The Constitution,' says the Vice-Presi- 
dent in the exposition before us, ' is as strictly and as purely a 
confederation, as the one which it superseded.' ' The case of 
a treaty between sovereigns is strictly analogous to it.' ' At 
the bottom of almost every misconception as to the relation 
between the States and the General Government, lurlcs the 
radical error that the latter is a national, and not, as in reality 
it is, a confederated Government.' 

In other times, when other doctrines were fashionable in 
South Carolina, we were told by one of her distinguished states- 
men of a very different radical error, which was lurJcing at the 
bottom of a doctrine which he then thought it his duty to op- 
pose. ' The States, as political bodies,' — said Mr. McDuffie 
in his well-known pamphlet, The Trio, published about ten 
years ago, — 'the States, as political bodies, have no original 
inherent rights. That they have such rights, is a false, dan- 
gerous and anti-republican assumption, which lurks at the bot- 
tom of all the reasoning in favor of State rights.' — Is there not 
room to apprehend that the error, which really lurks at the bot- 
tom in both these cases, is not precisely the one alluded to bv ei- 
7 



50 

ther of these distinguished statesmen, but another which was also 
signahsed by Mr. McDuffie on the same occasion and in the same 
pamphlet ? ' Ambitious men of inferior talents, finding that they 
have no hope to be distinguished in the councils of the national 
Government, naturally wish to increase the power and conse- 
quence of the State Governments, the theatres in which they 
expect to acquire distinction. It is not, therefore, a regard for 
the rights of the people, and a real apprehension that those 
rights are in danger, that have caused so much to be said on 
the subject of prostrate State sovereignties and consolidated 
empire. It is the ambition of that class of politicians who 
expect to figure only in the State Councils, and of those States 
who are too proud to acknowledge any superior.' 

This quotation was too provokingly apposite to be omitted ; 
but we frankly own that the question preceding it must, in refer- 
ence to the present case, be answered in the negative. The lead- 
ing nullifiers, though sufficiently ambitious, are not men ' of infe- 
rior talents, who can have no hope of distinguishing themselves 
in the councils of the national Government.' They possess tal- 
ents of a high order, and had already reached the most elevated 
stations in the National Government, before their judgments, 
previously sound and acute, had given way to the strange de- 
lusion which has now got possession of them. It is therefore 
necessary to look for the motives of their present proceedings ia 
other quarters. Perhaps we may find them pretty satisfactorily 
accounted for, in the following passage of the same publication 
by Mr. McDuffie. ' He must have read the lessons of history 
to little purpose, who does not perceive that the people of par- 
ticular States are liable to fall occasionally into a dangerous 
and morbid excitement upon particular subjects ; and that, un- 
der this excitement, they will impel their rulers into the adop- 
tion of measures in their tendency destructive to the Union.' 

But without undertaking to scrutinize the motives of the 
leading statesmen of South Carolina, we repeat that none of 
them have yet condescended to inform us, how they reconcile 
their admissions as to the authority of the General Govern- 
ment in ordinary cases, and that of the United States under 
the amending clause, with their doctrine of ' unimpaired sov- 
ereignty.' Mr. Calhoun, in the document before us, appears to 
be aware of the difficulty, but does not meet it in the full and frank 
manner which we had a right to expect from a man of his char- 
acter. He takes refuge in vague and indefinite forms of language. 



51 

^ Previous to the adoption of the present Constitution,' says 
he, '' no power could be exercised over any State, by any other 
-or all of the States, without its own consent.' In other words, 
the States were then independent of each other, and, in the 
common phrase, sovereign. How are they now? — 'The pre- 
sent Constitution,' continues Mr. Calhoun, ' has made in this 
particular a most important modification in their condition. 
1 allude to the provision which gives validity to amendments 
of the Constitution, when ratified by three-fourths of the States, 
a provision which has not attracted as much attention as its 
importance deserves.'* It appears, then, that although the sove- 
reignty of the States is unimpaired, their condition in this par- 
ticular has undergone a most imjjortant modification. Now the 
long word modification, though it be, like Bardolph's accom- 
modated, ' a soldier-like word, and a word of exceeding good 
command,' means, with all its six syllables, neither more nor less 
than the old-fashioned English monosyllable change. — Modifi- 
cation, says Johnson, is the act o\ modifying ; and to modify 
is to change. It seems, then, that the condition of the States 
has undergone in this particular a most important change. It 
is no longer what it was. But they were before independ- 
ent : of course they are now not independent. Such appears 
to be the plain English of the vague term modification. 

But to what extent has this modification been carried ? Be- 
fore the adoption of the Constitution no power could be exercised 
over a State without its own consent. Now, by the admission of 
Mr. Calhoun, the United States can exercise unlimited power 
over a State without its own consent. This is indeed a niost 
important modification of the sovereignty of the State. 
Such, however, is the virtue of this valuable word, that 
it prevents all the effect that would otherwise ensue to the 
sovereignty of the State from the change signified by it. ' To 
understand correctly the nature of this concession, (the modifi- 

* It is, in fact, rather singular, that until this mention of it by Mr. 
Calhoun, the amending clause of the Constitution liad, as far as Ave are 
informed, never been alluded to in connexion with the much-debated 
subject of State Sovereignty. It is obviously, of itself, decisive against 
any such pretension. There were originally two specific limitations 
to the amending power, one of which expired in the year 1808; the 
other, which is still in force, provides that no State shall in this way 
' be deprived, without its consent, of its equal suffrage in the Senate.' 
Of every other political power, privilege, liberty and franchise, a State 
may be constitutionally deprived, tvithout its consent. And yet the 
States retain their Sovereignty unimpaired ! ! ! 



62 

cation is after all a concession,) we must not confound it with 
the power conferred upon the General Government, and to be 
exercised by it as the joint agent of the States. They are 
essentially different. The former is in fact but a modification 
of the original sovereign power, residing in the people of the 
several States.' It seems, then, that this most important raodi- 
jication is in fact a modification. ' Accommodated is when 
a man is, as they say, accommodated, or when a man is being 
— whereby he may be thought to be accommodated.^ 'But,' 
continues the Vice-President, ' the original sovereign power 
residing in the people of the several States, though modified, 
is not delegated. It still resides in the States, and is still to 
be exercised by them, and not by the Government.' He had 
just told us, that the condition of the several States had under- 
gone in this particular a most important modification, by the 
concession of power made in the provision for amending the 
Constitution: — now there is no delegation, — no concession,— 
the sovereignty is modified, but the condition of the State remains 
as it was before. Did the Vice-President himself understand 
exactly what he meant to say? 

' It still resides in the States, and is to be exercised 
by them, and not by the Government.' How is this ? — 
Before the adoption of the Constitution, the whole po- 
litical power of each State resided in the State : now, a 
large portion of it has been transferred, by the provision for 
amending the Constitution, to the United States. How then 
can it be said, that the whole still resides in the State? Of 
what consequence is it whether the power has been conceded to 
the General Government, or to the United States ? Provided it be 
gone from the State, it is obvious that the sovereignty of the State is 
equally impaired, whether it now belongs to one or the other. 
The point which Mr. Calhoun wishes to make out is, that 
each State now possesses all the political power which it pos- 
sessed before the adoption of the Constitution. It is admitted 
that a large concession has been made. But, says Mr. Cal- 
houn, the power thus granted has been granted to the United 
States, and not to the General Government, — therefore, it still 
remains in the possession of the granting State ! The owner of 
a tract of land conveys away a part of it for a valuable con- 
sideration ; but the sale being made toB. and not to C, it follows, 
says Mr. Calhoun, that the whole remains in possession of A. 

If arguments like these were found in a document purporting 
to be a mere specimen of forensic ingenuity, or in the speech of a 



63 

)egal advocate who might be supposed to defend his chent, wheth- 
er he thought his case a good one or not, we should conclude, at 
once, that the person employing them had, from a conscious- 
ness of the weakness of his cause, resorted expressly to ambig- 
uous language, and loose sophistical reasoning. But the docu- 
ment before us is of a very different character and consequence. 
The subject which it treats is a great practical question. The 
author, — no less a person than the Vice-President of the United 
States, — has placed himself at the head of an enterprise, which, 
according to the degree of purity and singleness of heart with 
which he engages in it, must be regarded as in him the noblest 
exercise of patriotism, or the highest offence known to the 
law. Such is the individual, whom we find under such cir- 
cumstances resorting for his justification to a sort of language, 
which, in ordinary cases, would be received as the obvious re- 
source and undoubted evidence of insincerity. We shrink 
from characterizing such a course in the way which appears 
most natural, and gladly avail ourselves of the pointed and fear- 
less denunciation of Mr. McDuffie. 

' A man, who will contend that our Government is a con- 
federacy of independent States, whose independent sovereignty 
was never in any degree renounced, and th^t it may be con- 
trolled or annulled at the will of the several independent States 
or sovereignties, can scarcely be regarded as belonging to the 
present generation. The several independent States control 
the General Government ! this is anarchy itself 

It is unnecessary, we trust, to pursue this discussion any far- 
ther. The nullifiers, we repeat, scarcely attempt to reconcile their 
full and express admissions, that the Constitution is a social coiu- 
pact, by which the States have formed themselves into a body 
politic under a common Government, which body politic pos- 
sesses, under the amending clause, an unlimited power over 
the political condition of its members, with the assertion, 
openly and obviously inconsistent with these admissions, that 
each State still retains its independence and sovereignty entire 
and unimpaired. Their whole argument, such as it is, con- 
sists in the eternal repetition of two ideas. The States 
were independent at the time when they made the Constitu- 
tion, — therefore they are independent now, A. and B. 
were single persons at the time when they entered into a 
contract of marriage, therefore they are single still. The 
precise and avowed object of the contract, in both cases, 
is to put an end to the relation which the parties pre- 



54 

vlously held towards each other, and to substitute for it anothei' 
and a different one. Yet it is sagely concluded, that because 
they held towards each other this relation, which it was in- 
tended to terminate, before, they must of necessity hold it after- 
wards ; and this is the conclusion which the Vice-President and 
his followers declare themselves determined to enforce upon the 
people of the United States, if necessary, at the cannon's mouth ! 

What then, it may be asked, is in fact the situation of the 
States under the Constitution ? Are they mere corporations, 
like our cities and towns, deriving all their powers from the acts 
of the Government under which they are placed ? Assuredly 
not. The States are the original parties to the social compact, 
and are recog:;nised in it as entitled to exercise a certain por- 
tion of the legislative power. In the exercise of this power, 
they are, as we have already remarked, just as independent of 
the General Government, as the General Government is of 
them in the exercise of the powers with which it is invested by 
the same Constitution. But although the General Gov- 
ernment has no authority over the State Governments, the 
United States, besides the control which they exercise through 
the General Government over the citizens of the States, 
also possess, under the amending clause of the Constitu- 
tion, an almost unlimited control over the political situa- 
tion of the States themselves. Under these circumstances, 
it is obvious, that the States, though holding, not by law, but 
by an original right recognised in the Constitution, the legisla- 
tive power which they are entitled to exercise, have yet no 
pretensions to sovereignty or absolute political independence, 
and that, the only sovereign power, recognised in our institutions 
is that of the people or body politic of the United States. 

In the quotations which we have made from the pamphlet of 
Mr. McDuffie, we have employed to a very moderate extent 
the argumentum ad hominem., which, as our readers are aware, 
might "be carried without difficulty a great deal farther. There 
have probably been very few cases, in the history of this oi* 
any other country, — especially relating to matters of so much 
importance, — in which individuals have placed themselves be- 
fore the public, in a position so diametrically opposite to that 
which they occupied but a short time before. Their inconsistency 
is equally glaring in reference to the nature of the evil of which 
they complain, and the means by which they propose to reme- 
dy it. But a few years ago, these very persons not only sup- 
ported and professed to beheve in the policy of protecting 



55 

domestic industry, but actually originated the plan, and employ- 
ed the whole weight of their talents and influence in carrying 
it through Congress. At the same time, they denounced the 
claim of a right in the States to annul the acts of the General 
Government, as anarchy itself. Now, the protecting policy is 
not only not advantageous but utterly ruinous to the country ; 
and not only ruinous but unconstitutional, and not only uncon- 
stitutional but so plainly and palpably unconstitutional, as to 
justify a resort to the most desperate extremities to get rid of 
it. Now, the right of the States to annul at discretion the acts 
of the General Government is not only not anarchy itself, but 
is the simplest and most beautiful part of the whole machinery 
of our political institutions. It would be easy to collect from 
the writings and speeches of these gentlemen at the two periods 
alluded to, whole pages of passages, presenting, on the same 
authority, exactly the pro and con of every prominent point in 
the argument. This has in fact been done to a considerable 
extent by Mr. Carey, and if the subject were not a seri- 
ous one, the contrast would be irresistibly amusing. Our lim- 
its will not permit us to enlarge upon this point, and the 
strength of the direct argument renders it unnecessary. In 
general, we are not disposed to insist too rigorously upon formal 
party consistency, and are wiHing to allow to political men a 
reasonable latitude in reconsidering their opinions, and adapting 
their abstract principles to the circumstances under which 
they are called to act. But in a case so very peculiar as this, 
where the party is so clearly bound to put himself in the right 
in the great court of public opinion, he certainly gives his 
opponents a fearful advantage when he enables them, on every 
leading point, to condemn him unequivocally and peremptorily 
out of his oivn mouth. 

Is it in fact to be endured, that men of talents, reputation, 
commanding stations in society, shall denounce as inexpedient, 
unconstitutional, intolerably oppressive, as furnishing legitimate 
motives for resistance, measures, which not ten years ago they 
openl}^ supported, nay, themselves originated and pressed upon 
the country ? That they shall claim and insist upon, as their 
dearest and most essential rights, pretensions, which not ten 
years ago they denounced as chimerical, unconstitutional, 
anarchical, involving in practice the destruction of all govern- 
ment ? Can the people of the United States believe, that the 
persons by whom these diametrically opposite opinions have 



56 

been successively maintained with equal warmth and zeaT^ 
have been perfectly sincere in both ? Or if, in the exercise of 
a perhaps excessive charhy, they believe them to have been 
sincere, will they consider them as persons of a sufficiently sound 
and cool judgment to be followed with safety, through the 
dangerous paths into which they would lead us, — over the un- 
fathomable precipices, to the brink of which they have already 
brought their deluded retainers ? — We think not. 

We have left ourselves but little room for direct remark upon 
the Ordinance of the Carolina Convention ; and if the views 
which we take of its operation and character be correct, 
it does not necessarily call for any extended commentary. We 
copy the entire document, as a sort of political curiosity, and 
shall annex a few observations. 

* An Ordinance to nullify certain Acts of the Congress of the 
United States, purporting to he laics laying duties and imposts 
on the Importation of Foreign Commodities. 

Whereas the Congress of the United States, by various Acts, 
purporting to be Acts laying duties and imposts on foreign im- 
ports, but in reality intended for the protection of Domestic Man- 
ufactures, and the giving of bounties to classes and individuals 
engaged in particular employments, at the expense and to the 
injury and oppression of other classes and individuals, by wholly 
exempting from taxation certain foreign commodities, such eis 
are not produced or manufactured in the United States, to aiford 
a pretext for imposing higher and excessive duties on articles sim- 
ilar to those intended to be protected, hath exceeded its just 
powers under the Constitution, which confers on it no authority 
to afford such protection, and hath violated the true meaning and 
intent of the Constitution, which provides for equality in imposing 
the burdens of taxation upon the several States and portions of 
the Confederacy ; — And, whereas the said Congress, exceeding 
its just power to impose taxes and collect revenue for the purpose 
of effecting and accomplishing the specific objects and purposes 
which the Constitution of the United States authorized it to ef- 
fect and accomplish, hath raised and collected unnecessary rev- 
enues, for objects unauthorized by the Constitution: — 

We, therefore, the People of the State of South Carolina in 
Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby 
declared and ordained, that the several Acts and parts of Acts of 
the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the 
imposing of duties and imposts on the importations of the States, 
and more especially an Act entitled " an Act in alteration of the 



57 

several Acts imposing duties on imports," approved on the 19th 
day of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight, and 
also an Act entitled " an Act to alter and amend the several Acts 
imposing duties on imports," approved on the 14th day of July, 
one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, are unauthorized by 
the Constitution of the United States, and violate the true mean- 
ing thereof, and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon 
this State, its officers or citizens ; and all promises, contracts 
and obligations made or entered into, or to be made or entered 
into, with the purpose to secure the duties imposed by the said 
Acts, and all judicial proceedings which shall be hereafter had in 
affirmance thereof are and shall be held utterly null and void. 

And it is further ordained, That it shall not be lawful for any 
of the constituted authorities, whether of this State or of the Uni- 
ted States, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the said 
Acts within the limits of this State; but that it shall be the duty 
of the Legislature to adopt such Acts as may be necessary to 
give full effect to this Ordinance, and to prevent the enforcement 
and arrest the operation of the said Acts and parts of Acts of the 
Congress of the United States within the limits of this State, 
from and after the 1st day of February next, and the duty of all 
other constituted authorities, and of all persons residing or being 
within the limits of this State, and they are hereby required and 
enjoined to obey and give effect to this Ordinance, and such 
Acts and measures of the Legislature as may be passed or adopt- 
ed in obedience thereto. 

And it is further ordained. That in no case of law or equity, 
decided in the Courts of this State, wherein shall be drawn in 
question the authority of this Ordinance, or the validity of such 
Act or Acts of the Legislature as may be passed for the purpose 
of giving effect thereto, or the validity of the aforesaid Acts of 
Congress, imposing duties, shall any appeal be taken, or allowed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of 
the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose ; and if any 
such appeal shall be attempted to be taken, the Courts of this 
State shall proceed to execute and enforce their judgments, ac- 
cording to the laws and usages of the State, without reference to 
such attempted appeal ; and the person or persons attemptino- to 
take such appeal, may be dealt with for a contempt of the Court. 

And it is further ordained. That all persons now holding any 
office of honor, profit or trust, civil or military, under this State, 
shall, within such time as the Legislature shall prescribe, take, 
in such manner as the Legislature may direct, an oath well and 
truly to obey, execute and enforce this Ordinance, and such Act 
or Acts of the Legislature as may be passed in pursuance thereof, 
8 



58 

according to the true intent and meaning of the same ; and on 
the neglect or omission of any such person or persons so to do, 
his or their office or offices shall be forthwith vacated, and shall 
be filled up, as if such person or persons were dead or had re- 
signed ; and no person, hereafter elected to any office of honor, 
profit or trust, civil or military, shall, until the Legislature shall 
otherwise provide and direct, enter on the execution of his office, 
or be in any respect competent to discharge the duties thereof, 
until he shall, in like manner, have taken a similar oath ; and no 
juror shall be impannelled in any of the Courts of this State, in 
any cause in which shall be in question this Ordinance, or any Act 
of the Legislature passed in pursuance thereof, unless he shall 
first, in addition to the usual oath, have taken an oath, that he 
will well and truly obey, execute and enforce this Ordinance, and 
such Act or Acts of the Legislature as may be passed to carry the 
same into operation and effect, according to the true intent and 
meaning thereof 

And we, the People of South Carolina, to the end that it may 
be fully understood by the Government of the United States, and 
the People of the co-States, that we are determined to maintain 
this, our Ordinance and Declaration, at every hazard, — do further 
declare, that we will not submit to the application of force, on 
the part of the Federal Government, to reduce this State to obe- 
dience ; but that we will consider the passage, by Congress, of 
any Act authorizing the employment of any military or naval force 
against the State of South Carolina, her constituted authorities 
or citizens, or any Act abolishing or closing the ports of this 
State, or any of them, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress 
and egress of vessels, to and from the said ports, or any other Act 
on the part of the Federal Government to coerce the State, shut 
up her ports, destroy her commerce, or to enforce the acts hereby 
declared to be null and void, otherwise than through the civil 
tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continu- 
ance of South Carolina in the Union : and that the people of 
this State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all 
further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connex- 
ion with the people of other States, and will forthwith proceed to 
organize a separate Government, and do all other acts and things, 
which sovereign and independent States may of right do.' 

If, in a matter so serious as this, it were worth while to pay 
much attention to forms of expression, the language of this 
document would afford ample room for criticism. To begin 
with the very title : an Ordinance. It has been well observed, 
that the Convention could hardly have given to the paper 



59 

^sxpresslng their intentions a less auspicious name, than this 
obsolete vestige of the French ancien regime, the last exam- 
ple of which, known to us in this country, was the celebrated 
Ordinance to nullify the liberty of the press and the right of 
suffrage. The result of this attempt at nullification by Charles 
X. was hardly such as to encourage imitation, or to bring the 
phraseology employed by him into very good odor. — An Or- 
dinance to nullify, — why substitute the affected term nidlify, 
of which no one knows the real meaning, for the standard 
English word annul, which every body understands? Ob- 
viously for no other purpose, than to mystify the good people 
of Carolina into a course, which, if the true character of it 
were honestly presented to them, they would shrink from 
with horror. The use of this term is an improvement, at 
the suggestion of Mr. Turnbull, upon the title as originally 
reported by Mr. Harper, which ran thus ; — an Ordinance to 
provide for arresting the operation of certain acts, ^c. This 
was at least intelligible. Again : an Ordinance to nullify certain 
acts of Congress imrporting to he laios. Why piurporting to 
be laws? — They are laws. The Acts of the General Govern 
ment are, as such, laws. They may be inexpedient, oppressive, 
unconstitutional, — but they are still laws. This is their appro- 
priate name as Acts of the Government, and has no connexion 
with the question of their validity. The phraseology of the 
first sentence of the Ordinance is still more singular: — TVhereas 
the Congress of the United. States, by various Acts purporting 
to be Acts laying duties arid imposts on foreign imports, but 
in reality intended for the protectio7i of domestic manufactures. 
Purporting to be acts laying duties and imposts on foreign 
imports ! Can any one doubt that they are Acts laying duties 
on foreign imports? The objection to them is, that they lay 
duties for a purpose not recognised by the Constitution ; but no 
man in his senses can pretend to doubt, that they do in fact 
lay duties on foreign imports. 

The rest of the Ordinance is about as correctly drawn, as the 
title and the first sentence : but, without enlarging on mere phra- 
seology, let us proceed to considerations of a more substantial 
character. The questions that naturally suggest themselves on a 
perusal of this extraordinary document are, What is its immediate 
operation ? What measures will it call for, on the part of the 
General Government ? What will be its ultimate effect upon 
the political situation of the country ? 



60 

1. What is its immediate operation? In the view which 
we take of it, the Ordinance, standing by itself, is entirely in- 
operative. It pretends to release the citizens of South Caro- 
lina from the obligation to obey the Revenue laws, but it leaves 
the Government of the United States in possession of all the 
means which they had before to enforce them. If the importer 
refuse to pay the duties and give the usual bonds, the goods 
will of course be seized and sold without farther process. If 
he give bonds and refuse to pay them when due, the usual legal 
process will be had in the District Court ; and, as the jurors 
serving in that Court are not called on to take the oath to 
obey the Ordinance, there will be no appearance even of a 
conflict of obligations. The Judge, whose duty it is to instruct 
the jury in the law, will of course tell them that the Ordi- 
nance, as far as it contradicts the laws of the United States, 
has no legal eflect, and they will give their verdict accordingly. 
If, in some cases, juries, under the influence of the popular ex- 
citement, should undertake to judge of the law for themselves, 
and give verdicts in clear cases against the Government, there 
would be, no doubt, some practical inconvenience, but in 
theory the law would still have its course. There would be 
no collision between the authority of the General and State 
Governments, and no occasion for any interposition of force by 
the former. The situation of things would be substantially 
the same as it was in this city during the last war with Great 
Britain, where the juries habitually gave verdicts against the 
Government, in cases where the right was clearly on its side. 
Still the law ostensibly had its course, and the public peace 
was not broken. The Ordinance, therefore, standing by itself, is 
a mere dead letter. 

2. What measures does it call for, on the part of the Gen- 
eral Government ? The Ordinance, being entirely inoperative, 
and having no legal or practical effect which the Government 
can or ought to notice, of course calls for no measures in the 
way of counteraction. Considered as an indication of the state 
of the public feeling in South Carolina, it calls undoubtedly for 
measures of precaution against the occurrence of a future state 
of things, which the adoption of this Ordinance by the Conven- 
tion renders probable, and which would require the interposi- 
tion of the military power of the Government. The Ordi- 
nance makes it ' the duty of the Legislature to adopt such 
measures and pass such aets, as may be necessary to give full 



61 

effect to the Ordinance, and to prevent the enforcement and 
arrest the operation of the Revenue laws.' The Legisla- 
ture will probably do something in pursuance of this direction; 
and upon the character of the measures which they may adopt 
will depend, of course, the character of those with which the 
Government of the United States will be called on to meet 
them. Should they pass an act, making it penal for the offi- 
cers of the General Government to perform their duties, and 
attempt to enforce it upon the person of the Marshal, there 
would then be a case of open insurrection against the Govern- 
ment of the country. In ordinary cases, the Marshal, when 
obstructed in the execution of his duty, calls for aid on the by- 
standers ; but if this resource prove ineffectual, or if cir- 
cumstances render it inexpedient to depend upon it, the 
particulars of the case are communicated in the form of a 
certificate from the District Judge to the President, who imme- 
diately employs the military force of the country, either the 
regular army or the militia, at his discretion, to suppress the 
insurrection, as he is authorized to do by the letter of the Con- 
stitution and various statutes. The militia would of course 
not be resorted to, unless the regular military and naval 
force should be found insufficient. This course was pur- 
sued by General Washington, in the case of the whisky 
insurrection in Pennsylvania, and was attended with com- 
plete success. The misguided persons, who might be taken 
and brought to trial for obstructing the execution of the laws, 
would probably plead in justification the law of the State ; 
but the District Judge W'Ould of course instruct the jury, that 
' the laws of the United States are the supreme law of the 
land, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the 
contrary notwithstanding.' If the popular excitement should 
be so great, that juries should in clear cases acquit prisoners, 
the latter would of course escape the punishment they deserv- 
ed, but no material inconvenience would be suffered by the 
country. The President, by a proper development of military 
force, would be able to execute the laws and preserve the pub- 
lic peace. Should Carolina, in pursuance of the threat held 
out in the Ordinance, undertake, in consequence of the em- 
ployment of military force by the President, to place herself 
still more openly in opposition to the Government, by attempt- 
ing to withdraw from the Union, and arraying an army against 



62 

that of the United States, the result would be civil war, — an 
occurrence every way deplorable, and one of which we shud" 
der to contemplate the possibility, but of which we cannot per- 
mit ourselves to doubt the issue. 

Such, however, being the state of things which may and 
probably will grow out of the adoption of this Ordinance, it is 
apparent that it calls imperiously for measures of ijrecaution. 
Ample means should be in readiness to meet a crisis so serious 
and alarming. A seasonable display of energy and decision may, 
in this case, as it did in that of the whisky insurrection, save 
the country years of civil commotion, and probably decide the 
fate of the Union. We are, therefore, glad to learn that the 
President has already stationed in the disturbed district, as 
commander of the troops, an officer of the highest character for 
experience, talents and patriotism, and has made some other 
demonstrations for the same ultimate purpose. In general, the 
course of the Government, on this most important subject, as 
far as it has been developed, accords entirely with what we con- 
sider the true policy of the country. The tone of the Presi- 
dent's Message to Congress, and of Mr. McLane's Report in 
relation to this topic, is temperate and judicious, and the view 
taken of the nature of the crisis correct : a promise is also 
made of farther and more energetic measures, should the oc- 
casion require them. If the General Government continue to 
pursue with discretion, but at the same time with firmness and 
energy, the course upon which they have thus entered, they 
will find themselves supported by the friends of the country 
of all parties, and in all quarters of the Union. 

The only parts of the late communications of the Govern- 
ment, having any bearing upon this subject, which we have 
read with regret, have been those which recommend a reduc- 
tion of the revenue. Independently of the ruinous tendency 
of a repeal of the protecting duties, considered as such, it ap- 
pears to us that the moment is singularly unpropitious for the 
agitation of any plan, tending to diminish the receipts into the 
Treasury. In general, our statesmen have shown an unneces- 
sary solicitude about the disposition of a future possible surplus 
revenue, which has thus far never existed for a single moment 
since the organization of the Government. Mr. Jefferson felt 
this solicitude to a very great degree, and looked forward to 
the payment of the then existing national debt, as a period when 
we should find ourselves not a little embarrassed by the amount 



63 

of our superabundant treasures. Long before the expected pe- 
riod came, a foreign war intervened, and instead of having any 
surplus wealth to dispose of, we were compelled to borrow at 
very high interest. The present Administration have shown a 
strong, and in itself very laudable and politic anxiety to extin- 
guish the debt ; and have also, for two or three years past, 
begun to look forward with alarm to the influx of an over- 
whelming flood of surplus revenue, which is to burst upon us 
after the debt shall be paid. In the mean time, however, 
before any surplus whatever is realized, — while a considerable 
portion of the debt still remains unpaid, — two States have taken 
sucii a position in relation to the General Government, as will 
probably lead to a development of military force. The 
proceedings of Carolina have been already noticed at length. 
Georgia, on her part, peremptorily refuses to permit the judg- 
ment of the Supreme Court in the Missionary case to be exe- 
cuted. A return of this refusal will be made this winter to 
the Court, which will then, in the regular course of law, direct 
the Marshal of the district to execute the judgment himself 
In this he will probably be resisted, and upon the fact being cer- 
tified to the President, it will be his duty to employ the mili- 
tary force of the country to give efl:ect to the laws. Although 
the President, in pursuance of what we consider an erroneous 
construction of the Intercourse Act of 1802, did not undertake 
to prevent by force the irruption of Georgia into the Chero- 
kee territory, we are bound to presume that he will feel no 
hesitation about enforcing a judgment of the Supreme Court, 
regularly rendered in due course of law, and of which he can- 
not question the validity, without assuming the functions of an 
appellate tribunal. The result will be open collision. With 
every appearance of the occurrence of civil commotions in 
two States within the next year, it seems to us to be scarcely 
expedient, — independently of any other consideration, — to 
think of measures for reducing tlie revenue. As no surplus has 
yet been actually realized, the very first movement of troops 
would make it necessary to resort to new loans, which, if the 
troubles should continue, must be increased to an indefinite 
extent, and would effectually prevent the so much dreaded 
evil of an eventual surplus. We are inclined in fact to doubt 
very much, whether it will ever be found practicable to bring 
down the revenue below its present amount, even suppos- 
ing it to afford ten or fifteen millions more than is wanted 



64 

for the ordinary expenses of the Government. Such is the 
condition of human affairs, that periods of trouble of one kind 
or another must in the nature of things occur, at least as often 
as once in twenty or thirty years. These will, in general, 
render it necessary to resort to loans, which during the inter- 
vals of tranquillity must be extinguished. If, with taxes as light 
and as little felt as those which we now pay, we are able to defray 
the ordinary charges of the Government, — sustain the public 
credit, — meet the exigencies of foreign and civil war when they 
occur, and pay off the debts they impose upon us in time of 
peace, we shall do more, — far more, — than any other nation of 
ancient or modern times has done before us. At all events, the 
moment when we are about to enter on a period of civil commo- 
tion, of which the extent, duration and consequences cannot 
even be conjectured, is obviously the last that should be chosen 
for commencing a system of reduction. 

3. JVhttt ivill be the effect of the present trouhlcs upon the 
political co7idition of the country 1 

This will depend entirely upon the conduct of the General 
Government, and especially of the Executive branch, upon 
which, under present circumstances, the weight of responsibility 
principall)^ falls. If the crisis be met with the necessary firm- 
ness and discretion, there can hardly be a doubt, that the re- 
sources of the Union are amply sufficient to secure the execu- 
tion of the laws. If, from a want of firmness and discretion in 
the Executive, or of a disposition in Congress to sustain the 
Executive in the measin'es required by the crisis, — contingen- 
cies of which we cannot anticipate the possibility, — the nulli- 
fiers are permitted to carry their projects into effect, the Gov- 
ernment is of course at an end. The state of things which 
would then ensue, has been described somewhat in detail in a 
preceding part of this article. The ports of Carolina would be 
free, and the country would be deluged through them, with 
foreign goods imported without duties. The revenue would 
fall off to nothing ; the manufactures would all be destroyed ; the 
public credit would cease, and the public service come to a 
stand for want of funds ; a general bankruptcy of private for- 
tunes would overspread the country, and the body politic would 
fall into a state of complete dissolution. 

Of these disastrous results we are, however, unwilling to 
admit the possibility, although they would necessarily fol- 
low from the success of the projects of the nullifiers. It has 



65 

been well observed, that the attempt of a State to place itself 
in direct opposition to the authority of the Federal Govern- 
ment, is one of the evils naturally incident to our political sys- 
tem ; — that the occurrence of such an attempt is a sort of 
crisis, which we must have expected to go through at one time 
or another, as the individual, in his progress to maturity, is 
subject to the attacks of certain diseases, from which he can 
hardly hope to escape ; — and that the circumstances, under 
which this attempt is now made, afford perhaps as favorable 
a prospect as any that could well be imagined for such a 
termination of it, as will at once prevent any immediate 
mischief, and discourage the renewal of similar attempts 
in future. The State which now places itself in open op- 
position to the law, however distinguished in other times for 
intelligence, patriotism, and generosity, is physically and politi • 
cally one of the least effective in the Union. — With a white 
population of less than two hundred and fifty thousand souls, 
of whom at least a third are opposed to the project ; — 
with a dangerous internal enemy in her bosom ; — unsupported 
by the co-operation of any other State, her nearest neighbors 
being among the most determined opponents of her views ; — 
it is apparent that Carolina takes the field against the Union 
under every disadvantage. The fanaticism with which the 
nullifying party are inspired may perhaps give occasion to 
some distressing scenes: but should the General Government 
meet the crisis in a proper manner, the odds on the first de- 
velopment of military force will be so desperate, that we incline 
to think there will be very little occasion for actual violence, 
and that tranquillity will be restored with hardly any injury to 
life or property. Should such be the event, the probability of 
future occurrences of a similar kind will be diminished ; our 
institutions will acquire new force and stability ; and the general 
result of the whole affair will be favorable, rather than adverse 
to the prosperity of the country. Had the experiment of a 
violent opposition to the authority of the General Government 
been tried for the first time by New-York, Pennsylvania, Vir- 
ginia, New-England in a body, or any State or combination of 
States which would have been able to carry with it a great array 
of actual physical force, the crisis would have been of a very 
different character. 

We may add, that it is difficult to conceive of any case in which 
the right could be more clearly with the General Government, 
9 



66 

and against the discontented State, than it is in this : a cir- 
cumstance, which adds to the vast preponderance of material 
power at the disposal of the former, the moral influence 
which is so important and even essential to the success 
of any cause. However the nullifiers may, under the in- 
fluence of the enthusiasm which now possesses them, have 
wrought themselves up into a sincere belief in the justice 
of their cause, it is impossible but that in cooler moments 
they should feel its weakness. This conviction will press 
itself upon them with new force when the power of the 
Government is actually displayed, and will produce an in- 
decision on their part, which will contribute very much to 
bring the struggle to a favorable issue. 

Still, the crisis, — though as little dangerous as any one of the 
same description that could well be imagined, — is yet one of 
fearful importance, and the friends of the country cannot but 
look forward with deep and painful anxiety to its termination. 
The question of the continuance of our present form of Gov- 
ernment, — of the existence on this continent of republican in- 
stitutions of any description, — is now to be decided. The pre- 
cise proV)lem, as we understand it, is not whether the Union 
shall be preserved, but whether the Union shall be preserved 
under our present mild and beneficent system of polity, or 
whether, after a temporary dissolution of the bonds that 
now unite us, — we shall be brought together again into a 
new body politic, consolidated by the iron bands of military 
power. That the States comj^osing this Union can ever 
reman for any length of time politically separate from each 
other, is in the nature of things impossible. The experiment 
was tried in the short interval between the Declaration of 
Independence and the adoption of the Constitution, and was 
found impracticable. If repeated, under whatever circum- 
stances, the result would be the same. We have shown in a 
preceding part of this article that, by the present Constitu- 
tion, the'States formed themselves into one body politic under 
a common Government, and that they are now, in form, one 
people. If the Constitution were in this respect a false repre- 
sentation of their actual and substantial pohtical condition ; — if 
they were really separated from each other by important sub- 
stantial differences, whether of geographical position^ origin, 
language, physical conformation, or any others, there would 
then be a constant tendency to a dissolution of the Union ; and 



67 

separation, being the natural state of the parties, would 
probably, when it had once taken effect, become the per- 
manent one. Thus the attempt of the British Government 
to combine their European possessions and the colonies now 
composing the United States under one system of civil polity, 
was obviously at variance with the law of nature, and could 
only terminate sooner or later in the way in which it did. 
The same may be said of their present attempt to combine 
under the same political system with their European possessions, 
the northern part of this continent, — the vast peninsula of Hin- 
dostan with its hundred milhon inhabitants, — the southern 
termination of Africa, and half the islands on the face of the 
globe, — including (he Australian Continent, with its dependen- 
cies, which, of themselves, may be said to constitute another 
nc2u world. All these scattered limbs, — membra disjecta, — of 
the mighty Queen of the Ocean, — are destined to fall off 
successively from the parent body, and form themselves into 
independent States. With the members of this Union, the 
case is different. Descended from the same original stock ; 
united by community of language, literature, manners, laws, 
religion and government ; enclosed, notwithstanding the vast 
extent of their territory, by a border of unbroken geographical 
continuity ; — brought up from their first plantation, through the 
long period of colonial infancy, to their present flourishing and 
glorious maturity, as sisters of one family ; — bound together by 
the million various indissoluble ties of personal relationship, that 
have been created by a constant intercourse of more than two 
centuries, — the States composing this Union not only are, ac- 
cording to the form of the Constitution, but they are in fact 
and in feeling one people. They were united, before they 
framed the Constitution, by the high and paramount decree of 
the great Lawgiver of the universe : and whom God hath 
joined, man cannot put asunder. It is not enough to say, 
that the Union ought not to be dissolved, — that the States have 
no right to dissolve it, — that it is better that it should not be 
dissolved : — the truth is, that it cannot permanently be dissolved. 
Its members cannot exist for any length of time in a state of 
separation from each other. The present form of Union may, 
— should Providence intend to visit us with his severest judg- 
ments, — be temporarily broken up. What would be the con- 
sequence ? The very act of its destruction would in all prob- 
ability be attended by a development of military power and 



es 

a series of military movements, which would end in the 
recombination of the States into another Union, under a 
military Government. Should we even suppose, — what is 
next to impossible, — a peaceful temporary separation, what 
would still be the consequence ? The continual relations 
between twenty-four neighboring States of kindred origin and 
civilization, would necessarily lead to collisions, which would 
grow into wars, and these would continue until conquest had 
again consolidated the whole country into a new Union, not 
as at present, under the quiet reign of constitutional liberty, 
but under the sway, in some of its various forms, of a lawless 
and sanguinary despotism. 

The necessity of these results is apparent on the slightest 
reflection, and is confirmed by the examples of all the na- 
tions of which we know the history. To look only to 
the mother country : — a thousand years ago, the British 
islands w^ere occupied by hundreds of independent com- 
munities, essentially dififerent in their origin, languages, man- 
ners, laws, every thing that constitutes civilization. Con- 
tinued wars gradually brought them under common Govern- 
ments, until, at the close of the last century, the union of 
Great Britain and Ireland finally completed the consolidation 
of the whole into one political body. So it has been in 
France, in Holland, in Spain, in Germany, in Italy, in Russia. 
So it has been in ancient times and other regions ; — in Egypt, 
China, Greece, Rome. So it has always been and always 
must be every where. The European nations have all arrived 
through centuries of carnage and confusion at their present 
condition ; they are still tending violently to a more complete 
union, which, after other centuries of carnage and confusion, 
they will ultimately reach. It has been our blessed fortune 
to begin where they have ended or are likely to end ; to grow 
up from the hour of our political birth, in those happy bonds of 
fraternal kindness, which have been forced upon all other great 
nations by a long experience of the sorest evils. If, in an 
hour of wild delusion, — of mad insensibility to the causes of our 
present prosperity, — of criminal ingratitude to the Giver of 
all good, — we should burst these flowery fetters, the only pos- 
sible result would be, that after a period, more or less pro- 
tracted, of that confusion and carnage which we have thus far 
escaped, we should exchange them for the chains, that are now 
clanking round the limbs of every other people on the globe, 



69 

and from which the enlightened and civilized nations of Europe 
are at this moment straining in agony to set themselves free. 

The question, therefore, is not whether we shall maintain 
the Union, which must at all events exist, but whether we 
shall maintain our present republican institutions, or exchange 
them, after an intervening period of anarchy and civil war, for 
a Government of a different, probably an arbitrary character. 
The crisis, we repeat, though as little alarming as any one of 
the kind that could well be imagined, is nevertheless fraught 
with painful interest. But, though there is much in the pres- 
ent aspect of political affairs to create apprehension ; — although 
we are certainly very far from considering the country as per- 
fectly secure ; — we are nevertheless inclined to look forward 
with hope rather than despondency. We derive consolation, 
as well from the circumstances already mentioned, which induce 
us to believe that, with the exercise of suitable firmness and dis- 
cretion on the part of the Executive, the troubles in Carolina may 
be appeased without much difficulty, as from a general survey 
of the history and present situation of the country. It so hap- 
pens in the progress of human affairs, that the secret principles, 
which determine the welfare of nations, appear to operate with 
much greater activity at particular times and places than they 
do at others, although it may not be in every case very easy to 
point out exactly the causes of the difference. Why, at the same 
period, and under nearly similar circumstances, some com 
munities should be active, virtuous, civilized, prosperous and 
free, while others are roaming through the woods in the un- 
tamed wildness of barbarism, or bowing down like beasts of 
burden under the yoke of a taskmaster, — why the metropolis 
of civilization is to be found in one age upon the banks of the 
Ganges, the Euphrates or the Nile, and in another upon those 
of the Tiber, the Thames, or the Potomac ; are questions, 
which philosophy has not yet brought to a quite satisfactory 
solution. An English lady, in a fine poetical fiction, has attri- 
buted the various fortunes of the different nations and races of 
men to the influence of a Spirit to whom she has not given a 
name, but whom she would probably have called the Genius 
of Civilization, if a word so long could have been conveniently 
compressed into one of her verses. The presence of this 
Genius in a country is described as the fruitful cause of 
every blessing, and his retirement as the signal of impending 
decay and ruin ; but his origin is unknown, his progress 



70 

secret, and his movements are governed by caprice rather 
than by any obvious and assignable cause.* Without pursu- 
ing this train of thought, which would soon carry us very 
far beyond the limits of an article, it may be sufficient for 
our purpose to remark, that the presence of the most active 
principles of national prosperity, whatever they may be, has 
no where and at no time been more clearly perceptible 
than in the condition of this country, from the period of its 

* We allude to the following passage in Mrs. Barbauld's Eighteen 
Hundred and Eleven. 

There walks a Spirit o'er the peopled earth ; 
Secret his progress is, unknown his birth ; 
Moody and viewless as the changing wind, 
No force arrests his foot, no chain can bind. 
Where'er he turns the human brute awakes, 
And, roused to better life, his sordid hut forsakes ; 
He thinks, he reasons, glows with purer tires, 
Feels finer wants, and burns Avith new desires. 
Obedient Nature follows where he leads, 
The steaming marsh is changed to fruitful meads ; 
Then from its bed is drawn the ponderous ore; 
Then Commerce pours her gifts on every shore ; 
Then kindles Fancy, then expands the Heart ; 
Tiien blow the flowers of Genius and of Art ; 
Saints, Heroes, Sages, who the land adorn. 
Seem rather to descend than to be born ; 
While History, midst the rolls consigned to fame, 
With pen of adamant inscribes their name. 

The Genius now forsakes the favored shore, 
And hates, capricious, what he loved before. 
Then Empires fall to dust ; — then arts decay, 
And wasted realms enfeebled despots sway. 
E'en Nature's changed: — without his fostering smile, 
Ophir no gold, no plenty yields the Nile. 
The thirsty sand absorbs tho useless rill. 
And spotted plagues from putrid fens distil. 
In desert solitudes then Tadmor sleeps, 
Stern Marius then o'er fallen Carthage weeps; 
Then with enthusiast love the pilgrim roves 
To seek his footsteps in forsaken groves. 
Explores the fractured arch, the ruined tower, 
Those limbs disjointed of gigantic power. 
Still at each step he fears the adder's sting, 
The Arab's javelin or the tiger's spring, 
With doubtful caution treads the echoing ground, 
And asks where Troy and Babylon are found. 



71 

first settlement to this day. When we look back to the hand- 
ful of obscure adventurers and persecuted outcasts who formed 
our small beginnings, and compare their humble dwellings, scat- 
tered thinly along the coast, with the great and flourishing empire 
that now stretches in pride and beauty far and wide over half the 
continent, we cannot but feel that the history of the world offers 
no example, in any way parallel, of a rapid and extensive 
development of all the elements of national prosperity. When 
we contemplate the condition of the country at this very time; 
population proceeding in the same steady untiring progress, — 
wealth augmenting in a still more rapid ratio, — every branch of in- 
dustry animated by the highest degree of activity and enterprise, — 
agriculture and commerce supplying the markets of the world 
with our products, — manufactures rapidly rivaling the most per- 
fect establishments of Europe, — improvement in science and 
leai-ning, education, morals, and religion, the object of general at- 
tention and solicitude; — when we contemplate this state of things, 
we cannot doubt, that the causes to which we have owed our pros- 
perity are still as busily at work as they have ever been before. 
What they are, it might not be safe, even in reference to our 
own country with which we are most familiar, to attempt to say. 
When we venture to assign, as one of them, the character of 
our Government, the sages of Europe smile in conscious supe- 
riority at our simplicity, and assure us that we have become 
what we are in spite of our institutions, and not in consequence 
of them. When we hint at the fixed religious principles, the 
stern morality, the persevering industry of the pilgrim fathers 
of New-England, who have formed the kernel of the whole 
population of the Union, we are scornfully told that the mass 
of the original settlers were, after all, the refuse of the British 
jails. The only principle of our success, which is readily ad- 
mitted by our friends abroad as real, (it being one which con- 
fers no credit upon us) is the immense extent of our territory ; 
although, if this circumstance alone could make a people 
prosperous, it is not easy to see why civilization should not be 
as active on the vast central plateaux of Tartary and Mexico, 
as it is in the valley of the Mississippi. But whatever may be 
the cause, such at all events is the effect. We are undoubt- 
edly at a period of our national existence corres|)onding with 
the youth of a vigorous and healthy individual, when the body 
is daily developing new resources in all its parts, and possesses 
an elasticity which enables it to throw off without difficulty 



72 

almost every principle of evil that may be introduced into it. 
We say not this to encourage a reckless confidence, or a dispo- 
sition to bold and hazardous experiments on our political institu- 
tions. We are well aware that the strength and buoyant 
spirits, which betray to excess, may be themselves the very 
causes of ruin. We would rather in ordinary times allay than 
exalt the sentiment of national pride, whicli so easily runs into 
presumption. But when the crisis is actually upon us, — when 
the hour of danger has come, and many good and wise men are 
perhaps too prone to despond, and even despair of the Repub- 
lic, it may then be well to remind them and ourselves, that if 
the trial is likely to be severe, our political Constitution, as 
we have reason to hope, is strong enough to enable us, with the 
favor of Providence, to go through this and many other trials of 
equal severity, should it be our fortune to encounter them, with 
safety. 

Let the friends of the country, therefore, in their several 
spheres of action, meet the crisis with a cheerful, resolute 
spirit, and with the calm and steady courage that belongs to 
freemen and Christians. Let no differences of opinion upon 
minor questions, — no personal or sectional preferences be 
permitted to deter any one from a zealous and cordial co-opera- 
, tion in the great and good work of securing the Union. Among 

\ the private citizens, the LTnion party within the State of South 

Carolina occupy the post of peculiar honor and danger, and 
should receive our warmest sympathy. They have now a 
glorious opportunity of displaying in the face of the country, of 
the world, the noblest civic virtues. But whatever may be 
done by individuals within or without the State, the result will, 
after all, depend in a very great degree, as we have already 
said, upon the temper and conduct of the General Government. 
It is therefore with real satisfaction, that we find the Adminis- 
tration exhibiting, thus far, the union of firmness and discretion 
which the occasion requires. We are no partisans, political 
or personal, of General Jackson. We have in no way contri- 
buted to his elevation; and although, as journalists, we have 
taken no part in the recent contest, we have felt it to be our 
duty, as individuals, to oppose his re-election. But he is now 
the Chief Magistrate of the country. The people look to 
him to carry them safely through the present season of alarm 
and peril, and in all the suitable measures which he may take 
for this purpose, the friends of the country, without distinction 



V 



73 



of party, vviil give him their support. The maxim whJr^h 
ought to dn-ect his course was dis&tly statefby hSfTh el 
years ago, in terms which cannot be surpassed L Ssinn n! 
energy and which ought at this period to brthewrtchZH f 



^^1 



10 



OtC ^S ^^' 



NOTE. 

Since this article was prepared, and while it was going through 
the press, new events have occurred, which render the crisis still more 
interesting. Tlie Legislature of South Carolina, in pursuance of the 
recommendation contained in the Ordinance of the Convention, are en- 
gaged in passing several acts, the substantial purport of which is to make 
it a penal offence for the officers of the General Government to execute 
the Revenue laws within that State. On the other hand, the President 
of the United States, on the 10th of December, published a Proclama- 
tion, in which, after explaining at length his views of the relation es- 
tablished by the Constitution between the General and State Gov- 
ernments, he declares his determination to cause the laws to be 
executed, if necessary, by force. It is not probable that either party 
will recede, without a struggle, from the ground thus taken. The 
immediate occurrence of actual collision between the General and 
State Governments, however much to be deplored, seems, therefore, 
to be inevitable. The duration and results of this conflict will depend 
upon the degree of countenance which Carolina may receive from 
other States, particularly at the South. We look with some appre- 
hension to the proceedings of Virginia, where the first movements are 
less satisfactory than we could have wished. We cannot now enlarge 
upon the President's Proclamation, and shall probably have occasion 
to return to the subject hereafter. This paper, the composition of 
which is attributed to the Secretary of State, is written with great 
ability and in a very bold and determined tone. In some of the doc- 
trines, particularly those which represent the States as having never 
been politically independent of each other, and the Constitution as 
having been the work of the aggregate mass of the people of the 
United States, and not of the States as distinct communities, we do 
not concur, for the reasons which we have stated in the present arti- 
cle ; and we consider it unfortunate that they were introduced, as they 
Avill naturally tend to alienate the Southern States from the General 
Government, and dispose them to countenance the pretensions of Car- 
olina. In the doctrines of the Proclamation, so far a.s it affirms that 
the United States are notv one people under a common Government, — 
that the acts of this Government are the supreme law of the land, and 
that this must at all events be executed, we heartily concur. The 
firm tone of this document suits the occasion as well as the personal 
character of the President ; and if the measures by which it is to be 
followed up are conceived in a corresponding spirit, properly tem- 
pered with discretion, and an affectionate regard for our mistaken 
brethren of South Carolina, we cannot permit ourselves to doubt, that 
the ultimate effect of the struggle will be to confirm and perpetuate 
our institutions, rather than to bring them into danger. 



LRBMr"24 



